Ethical problems of the prediction and the prevention of premature crime

Abstract

The prevision and the prevention of criminal and abnormal behaviour are very debated topics in criminology. Actually, since the concept of prevention implies in theory the use of any useful mean for trying to reduce the amount of crimes in any age group, the question is which strategies could in fact bring about such an effect. From a historical point of view, this thought requires being aware both of the limits, and of the consequences of the crime prophylaxis itself. It requires being aware of the limits, because every hypothetical prevision can be denied by a high number of variables, which in any moment can modify the course of human behaviour. One should as well be aware of consequences, because, in case a prognosis turned out to be wrong, those behaviours which one wanted to prevent, might paradoxically be reinforced through processes of marginalization and labelling. On the other hand, a preventing and predictive judgement has implications of different kinds: 1) technical, because it results in interventions more or less focused on specific problems (preventing a bank robbery is different from preventing a familiar/domestic crime); 2) prescriptive, which is essential, since the life of a social group could never do without shared and followed rules (a penalty may even have a deterrent effect, if the leading group complies with the rules); 3) ethical, necessarily linked to a principle of benefit (who will enjoy benefits from preventing certain crimes? where is the advantage?). This discussion becomes even more complicated, if referred to those adolescent behaviours which are not only problematical (since they express a developmental discomfort, which can sometimes have even a psychopathological meaning), but also dysfunctional, and therefore antisocial, because they damage the respect of the “other”, required and imposed by the rule, in order to grant social harmony. In this sense, we also talk of “ premature delinquency” meaning a criminal behaviour acted by a minor who is under 14.The question about it is whether, in this age group, the prediction of a possible developmental path in a psychopathological and/or abnormal and/or criminal sense might meet the need either of social control (moreover necessary, at least within certain limits), or of healthcare of the individual, who, in such phase, often acts antisocial behaviours due to psychodevelopmental reasons, in addition to social ones. Everybody knows about the risks and the damages caused by a merely “oracular” work; this is why we cannot leave them aside, particularly when it comes to the building of the personal identity, which could irreparably become a negative identity, just because of a wrong or anyway abnormal prognosis. On the other hand, we have to consider the psychic potential of under 14 subjects, which is available also in a developmental perspective, and even when they are abnormal subjects: a prevention avoiding stigma and aiming at repairing or reinforcing the personal identity seems to meet the need of preserving both the interests of the community (by neutralizing the risk of repeating offence by the same individual) and of individual psychophysical wellness (through a project which enables the individual to rebuild himself by interiorizing positive values). Human existence is necessarily oriented towards a future, which one can be more or less aware of, which is nevertheless inescapable.Therefore, giving growth paths and indicating developmental routes to antisocial under 14 subjects could be a way of preventive intervention, based on an ethical ground, which would lead to an adequate balance between the limits of a merely stigmatizing basis and the need of encouraging respect and improvement of the others.