Identity and difference: Severino and Heidegger
The concept of identity represents one of the most signiﬁcant concepts through which to measure the philosophies of Severino and Heidegger. For Severino, identity cannot be the identity of the diﬀerent, because the identity of the diﬀerent, or of the non‐identical, is exactly the concept of becoming, which leads to the idea that wood becomes ash, and thus is ash, or, in general, that the subject is the predicate, that A is B, or not‐A (which is a contradiction). Unlike Severino, Heidegger conceives of identity as a “synthesis of the diﬀerent”, as is clear in his interpretation of Parmenides’ Fragment 3 in Identity and Diﬀerence: the same (das Selbe) is not the identical (das Gleiche). The problem of the relation between identity and diﬀerence can be traced back to the debate between Monists and Pluralists in Plato’s Sophist: this discussion will be the focus of the conclusion, where I try to show that the diﬀerent (ἕτερον) is not the condition of the contradiction, but what prevents it.