The problem of negation in the primal structure
In the primal structure the negation is not only the formal constituent of the determinacy of any being but it is a being itself, that must be negatively determined. This means that the primal structure affirms the meaningfulness of such a proposition: “the not is not the otherthan-the-not”. This article shows that in the primal structure an abyssal thesis seems to be demonstrable: ‘the not is the nothing’, that affirms that the negation semantically equals to
the nothingness. The demonstration actually exploits an ambiguity between the verbal negation of being ‘is not’ and the different-from-the-‘is’. The logical-linguistic solution of this ambiguity is essentially inadmissible in the primal structure. At the same time, it seems that within it the difference between the two senses of the negation of the ‘is’ remains ultimately without a syntactic foundation.