

# Philosophy of values as the basis of the directions in the development of educational science in Poland (1918–1939)

## Filosofia dei valori come base delle direzioni di sviluppo nelle scienze dell'educazione in Polonia (1918-1939)

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*Pedagogy of culture in Poland has experienced a broad, diverse and multi-threaded kind of development. A personal-creative role of values in the process of education lies at its core, while the pluralism of its directions stems from the different philosophical bases (along with religions affiliated with them) that became the constituents of its concepts. The article presents the classification of the selected directions in the development of educational science. It brings out both their individuality and specificities. The core aim is to present the panorama of directions within the 'pedagogy of culture' in Poland in 1918-1939 with their philosophical and educational foundations, also characteristic of the rest of Central Europe at the time.*

#### Keywords

**pedagogy of culture, polish pedagogy, philosophy of values, pedagogy of values**

La “pedagogia della cultura” in Polonia ha conosciuto uno sviluppo esteso, complesso e multiforme. Al cuore di tale sviluppo si trova il ruolo creativo e personale dei valori nel processo educativo, mentre il pluralismo delle direzioni intraprese si radica in diverse ispirazioni filosofiche (e religiose ad esse affiliate) che ne ispirano i concetti. L'articolo presenta la classificazione di alcune direzioni di sviluppo delle scienze dell'educazione, sottolineandone le specificità e particolarità. L'obiettivo è presentare il panorama di correnti nella “pedagogia della cultura” in Polonia nel periodo 1918-1939 con attenzione ai fondamenti filosofici e pedagogici, comuni alla cultura dell'Europa Centrale nello stesso periodo.

#### Parole chiave

**pedagogia della cultura, pedagogia in Polonia, filosofia dei valori, pedagogia dei valori**

## 1. Introduction

It is widely acknowledged that the anti-naturalist turn in the humanities (also known as the “new humanities”), which took place in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century under the influence of German idealism, the Baden neo-Kantians (Windelband, Rickert) and the phenomenologists (Scheler, Niemeyer), contributed to the development of educational science. The direction of development in educational science was inspired by different concepts of the philosophy of values and was described in Polish science as the “pedagogy of culture” or, less often, the “pedagogy of spiritual life” (and I propose such a translation of this Polish term in this paper). In German literature, it was referred to as *geisteswissenschaftliche Pädagogik* (Tröhler, 2003, pp. 759–778). The aforementioned *spirituality* was based on an extended understanding of the Hegelian objective Spirit as the subject and content of history (Hegel referred to Spirit as “all morality, law, art, religion and philosophy that is a historical normative implementation of general values in cultural assets” (Suchodolski, 1993, p. 548)). Wilhelm Dilthey’s concept and notions of: spirit, values and the “understanding” of mental and spiritual worlds (the understanding of people and senses), which were contrasted with the positivist “explanation”, were direct and methodologically the most inspiring ideas for the pedagogy of culture. Understanding the spiritual reality (along with its methodological scheme) became the leading thesis of the new humanities and, at the same time, the pedagogy of culture, offering a type of cognition that was oriented on values and cultural assets.

This interpretation of the sources and development of the pedagogy of culture [Germ. *geisteswissenschaftliche Pädagogik*] is based on actual phenomena, yet it ignores the contribution of the philosophy of realism and theistic realism (Thomism and neo-Thomism) to the pedagogy of culture and, as such, must be regarded as one-sided. The opposite direction of the development of the pedagogy of culture rooted in theistic realism did not have such a spectacular founding moment as the “anti-naturalistic turn” (due to its permanent distance to it), but it was continued immediately after St. Thomas’s work. In the inter-war period, concepts of the pedagogy of culture focused on values and cultural assets were significantly developed with the participation of theistic realism. As has been already mentioned, the development was stopped by the ideological terror in Poland after World War II.

In addition to these tendencies in the Polish pedagogy of culture between 1918 and 1939, there was a humanistic and pedagogical thought that preferred neither idealism nor theistic realism. It was Florian Znaniecki’s culturalism and socialist concepts sympathetic to Marxism that set down its leftist direction of development.

This situation, pluralistic as it was, gave rise to three directions of the development of the pedagogy of culture in Poland between 1918 and 1939:

- 1) the secular and idealistic direction – referring to the philosophy of German idealism, Hegel’s objective Spirit, the Baden neo-Kantians and the

- phenomenologists. In Poland, it was represented primarily by Bogdan Nawroczyński and Sergiusz Hessen;
- 2) the Catholic and realistic direction – based on the philosophy of theistic realism (Thomism and neo-Thomism), critical of the philosophy of German idealism (particularly the Hegelian objective Spirit) and neo-Kantianism; strongly striving to preserve Polish cultural and national identity. In Poland, it was represented by Fr. Jan Cierniewski, Fr. Zygmunt Bielawski, Sr. Barbara Żulińska, C.R., Fr. Henryk Weryński, Lucjan Zarzecki and Stefan Szuman;
  - 3) the leftist and culturalistic direction – rooted in leftist Polish philosophy and culture (Edward Abramowski, Stanisław Brzozowski) and Marxist ideology, represented by Zygmunt Mysłakowski and Bogdan Suchodolski; there was also Florian Znaniecki's culturalism which was inspired by various philosophical and ideological sources.

As Catholicism was the dominant religion in Poland, the Catholic and realistic direction left the greatest legacy in the form of a wide range of pedagogical concepts. The openness of Poland also led to the development of other directions as shown by the country's pluralistic traditions.

## 2. Contexts of the philosophical and religious sources of the pedagogy of culture

The philosophy of values played a significant role in the interwar period. Within theistic realism and Catholic pedagogy, it was noticed that there was a struggle between Christian and non-Christian world views. The philosophy of life was considered the leading type of the philosophy of values. In the non-Christian version, life was opposed to the spirit, with which Christian realists disagreed, claiming that spiritual functions also belonged to life. The representatives of the non-Christian version (F. Nietzsche, W. Dilthey, T. Lessing) included conscious, rational cognition and rational will in the scope of the spirit; life was supposed to include the irrational sphere of the soul, i.e. drives, feelings, emotional and intuitive cognition, and subconscious experiences (Sawicki, 1936, pp. 8-19). The philosophy of life embedded in the nineteenth-century German idealism, and Hegel's philosophy in particular, was to replace traditional religion (the concepts of objective Spirit and Idea replaced the concept of God). The belief in culture – understood as values (assets) developed throughout history – was to be opposed to “non-historical religious metaphysics and, at the same time, discipline man and master his individuality by pointing to objective developmental necessities” (Suchodolski, 1947/1948, pp. 315-316). The new religion, the “religion of culture”, became a demanding tool of the historical spirit. The Hegelian heritage affected the further development of the pedagogy of culture which aimed – as Suchodolski writes – at enclosing man in the historical and social world, rejec-

ting religion and superhistorical metaphysics in addition to subordinating them to the interests of groups. In times of nascent Nazism, this idea directed the pedagogy of culture towards the ideas of state and totalism. This was reflected primarily in the pedagogy of G. Gentili, P. Petersen and E. Krieck. In Poland, it is believed that these people discredited the pedagogy of culture (Ivi, p. 316), making it Nazi.

In response to these philosophical foundations of pedagogy, the realists (neo-Thomists) pointed to other sources of the philosophy of values adopted on Catholic grounds; they indicated their origins in Plato, Aristotle and scholasticism. While the theory of values was not yet an independent and separate theory, the concept of value was included in the concept of good in “perennial philosophy”. A value was believed to be that which is honourable and respectful because it is useful, pleasant and beautiful (Sawicki, 1936, p.18).

In opposition to the approach of the value theory and *geisteswissenschaftliche Pädagogik* based on the German idealistic philosophy (including neo-Kantianism), Franciszek Sawicki created its realistic and neo-Thomist variant. It was outlined in his work entitled *Filozofia Życia [The Philosophy of Life]* (1936). He entered into a polemic with idealists, proposing a Catholic understanding of values and the philosophy of life. In this way, he questioned the fact that the philosophy of values was first introduced by the Neo-Kantian-Baden School and the phenomenologists (M. Scheler). By unveiling the presence of values in Thomism, he confirmed the existence of Catholic sources of this variety of the philosophy of culture and pedagogy.

Sawicki adopted a negative approach to theories according to which values are deprived of objective meaning and made dependent on a human being. Consequently, subjectivism and relativism become cognitive, moral and aesthetic attitudes, and the world of values cannot become a higher order for a human being (Sawicki, 1938). In this way, man is deprived of faith in the world of divine ideas of truth, goodness and beauty. Here, Sawicki agreed with Jaspers (1933, p.13) that man deprived of faith faces nothingness (Sawicki, 1936, p. 32). When distinguishing two basic groups of values, sensual and spiritual, Sawicki gave precedence to spiritual values – which is a constant feature of this philosophy. According to him, the latter include logical, aesthetic, moral and religious values, while the former include sensual pleasures, useful (economic) values and vital values (health, physical strength). Values are independent of man and he should recognise them. Spiritual values are valid for all people at all times, regardless of class, nationality, and other differences including, inter alia, truth, justice, faithfulness and honesty. They are the reflection of the highest value which is God. They are manifested in natural laws, and all norms and principles of the practice of life originate in the sphere of the spirit (Sawicki, 1936, p. 34). Sawicki’s concept shows the distance between the spirit of Catholic realism (Thomism) and the spirit of the idealistic (Protestant) philosophy of values.

Sawicki notices that philosophers of values include thinkers who are close to Christianity. He accepts the statements of Windelbank, Rickert and Scheler in which they acknowledge the existence in the world of “the eternal

values of truth, goodness and beauty, similar to the Platonic world of divine ideas” (Sawicki, 1936, p. 19), but he questions the antecedence of their views. He claims that this thought refers to the philosophy of Saint Augustine, who said that “all truth and all goodness is a reflection of the eternal truth and absolute goodness which is God” [Ibidem, as quoted in Minrath (1927)]. He adds that Thomas Aquinas also took account of the value of earthly cultural assets, respecting the supremacy of supernatural assets.

### 3. The secular and idealistic direction

The pre-1939 chronological origin of the secular and idealistic thought should be associated with the beginning of the Reformation, through Hegel’s works, through the Baden neo-Kantianists. Bogdan Nawroczyński is the most outstanding representative of the Polish pedagogy of culture originating in the German idealistic philosophy.

***The concept of Bogdan Nawroczyński (1882-1974).*** As an avowed representative of the pedagogy of culture, Nawroczyński stressed his intellectual relations with the aforementioned group of German humanists. On the other hand, he also had scholarly connections with the Lvov-Warsaw School. Declaring his support for the slogans of the French Revolution, he also emphasised his attachment to his national culture and his own patriotism, stressed the importance of the nation and Polish affairs, and even took up fight for the country (Nawroczyński, 1932). His national and patriotic views clashed with his secular sympathies and references to the French Revolution.

Nawroczyński’s pedagogy and philosophy of culture is particularly expressed in his research subject, which is spiritual life. Its internal dimension could have inclined him to focus on the individual, but Nawroczyński concentrated on a group, humankind (Nawroczyński, 1947, p. 45)<sup>1</sup>. In his opinion, in the development of culture people aspire to increasingly ambitious goals and finally to absolute values. This is, he stated, the ultimate goal of both the individual and humankind. He reached for absolute values which humanise our species and expressed the hope that they would contribute to the creation of the idea of humankind. For him, this idea replaces the Absolute as something that is above everything; something that “has never been and is not. However, it is also something ... that should be” (Nawroczyński, 1947, p. 223). Is this humankind ideal? As Nawroczyński wrote, this ideal is now possible in small groups of friends. Ultimately, in reference to Edward Abramowski, he saw the future organisation of humankind in economic and cultural communities (Ivi, p. 116).

1 I include this work in the legacy of 1918–1939, because the author wrote it during the German occupation (1939–1945).

In Nawroczyński's concept, and therefore his pedagogy of culture, spiritual life is associated with pursuing a goal; this long-term perspective builds up tension – the more distant the target is, the more intense the tension becomes. It occurs

between being (that which exists) and the world of values (that which does not, but should exist). Being, however, is immune to the world of values. It takes a lot of effort to adjust it to human purposes. This is also hindered by the objectivisation of cultural assets. Decomposition of moral life is the most dangerous as it sooner or later leads to the decomposition of the entire culture (Ivi, p. 115).

The rescue lies in man and the strength of his character. Weak people cannot advance culture and fail to bear its message. Therefore, spiritual life – and thus education – is not an idyll; it becomes a “fight” and sometimes a drama (Jedynak, 2004, p. 115). Man should take this effort – with the help of education – for “future humankind” and the wealth of their own spiritual life.

#### 4. The Catholic and realistic direction

The Catholic and realistic direction is characterised by a different understanding of values, spirit, and spirituality than the idealistic and Protestant ones. Its conclusions on the grounds of the philosophy of culture, the philosophy of religion, the sociology of culture and the sociology of religion are positive towards religion. The Catholic and realistic direction states that the presence of God does not close man to the reality of culture and to creativity within this culture. The basic condition for the existence and meaning of the pedagogy of culture is preserved here: relations between culture and the personality structures of a pupil are subject to development as the mutual interaction becomes deeper – and this fact is the main axis of educational processes in any concept aspiring to the pedagogy of culture. This echoes the realistic tradition originating in Aristotelean thought that is still valid today (Tröhler, 2003).

It is worth pointing out which of the idealistic and Protestant assumptions could not gain acceptance in the realist and Catholic thought. Selected anthropological assumptions are important for pedagogy. “In Protestantism (M. Luther), it was assumed that human nature is completely marred by the original sin” (Jaroszyński, 2005, p. 139) and that man is unable to repair it. On the other hand, God helps only those who he wants to help. Already this one element shows how much Protestantism differs from the Catholic approach, according to which human nature is good and only has a flaw (like “a crack on the glass”). The grace of Providence strengthens human aspiration for self-improvement, which encourages self-education. A pupil's bad behaviour is not corrected through “condemnation” (as in Victorian morality), but by promoting good behaviour. Moreover, the Hegelian concept of objective

Spirit cannot be accepted in the Thomist conceptions of the philosophers of culture because:

[Hegel] incorporated the nature-culture opposition into his philosophical system. Nature is shown as ... something alien to Spirit. On the other hand, Spirit contains culture (art, philosophy, religion) which manifests the return of the Absolute to itself. Culture is not a complement to nature, but its opposition, and can only function in the domain of Spirit (Ivi, p. 139).

Meanwhile, in Thomistic philosophy and its continuations in personalism: “Culture must be open to religion because human nature is oriented on goals (the values of truth, goodness and beauty), which cannot be achieved only thanks to nature ... or thanks to culture alone” (Ivi, p. 139). Religion makes the spiritual development of personality dependent on experiencing and creating values and relationships to God more consistently than, for example, art.

***The concept of Jan Ciemniewski (1866-1947)***<sup>2</sup>. This author presented the framework of his concept in his work entitled *Nauka szkolna w zastosowaniu do psychiki i kultury polskiej* [School Education as Applied to the Polish Psyche and Culture] (1919), which can be called his programme manifesto. He addressed it to the future creators of the Polish schooling system in November 1919 in connection with the regaining of independence by Poland. He claimed that in order to maintain Polish statehood – which would best be done by the Polish home and school – it is necessary to bring up a free, independent and energetic man and woman who, at the same time, thinks and feels as a Pole. The school should arouse the self-preservation instinct and teach living in freedom and self-direction under new political conditions. Ciemniewski based his programme manifesto on his outline of Polish culture.

He began its reconstruction from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. At that time, the Polish nation “based itself on the moral principle of humanity and not only discovered it as something permanent and unremitting, but even opposed this principle to the Christian-German Europe already in the Middle Ages” (Ciemniewski, 1919, p. 13). The quality of Polish culture made itself known on the battlefields of Varna, Vienna and Cecora. It is based on the fact that:

Poland was a precursor of human rights and man’s self-governance. By the fifteenth century, it introduced the principle of the people’s self-government and implemented it at home in the sixteenth century. The laws of *Nihil novi* and *Neminem captivabimus* place Poland ahead

2 I reconstruct this concept in more detail in [J. Kostkiewicz (2013). *Kierunki i koncepcje pedagogiki katolickiej w Polsce* [Directions and concepts of Catholic pedagogy in Poland] 1918-1939. Kraków: Impuls: pp. 207–234].

of other European countries. The king in Poland was only a guardian of the law and nothing more, and the state was not the goal but the means to realise the noble type of man, a free citizen of the country and the world. Poland was the only state in central Europe that was based on free and voluntary membership of citizens. Only Poland expanded its territories through unions (Ciemniewski, 1919, p. 14) while other countries did so through partitions.

In Polish culture, the tendency for the supremacy of moral power over established law and the glorious absence of “the cult of law” guarded the country against phenomena that affected the West (including religious persecution). Ciemniewski repeats Artur Górski’s words: “Poland killed the ghost of statehood. It replaced the concept of the state with the notion of homeland ... it encompasses a religious approach to man’s attitude to the world; religious, that is, connected with the whole of being” (Górski, 1919, p. 13). Polish culture of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was the leader among nations fighting for freedom and human rights.

Moreover, Poland often defended Christian principles to the detriment of its own interest. Western Europe was notorious for fanaticism, religious intolerance (the Inquisition) and religious wars. Poland did not know these phenomena and rather was characterised by religious tolerance. Ciemniewski recalls Brückner’s statement that, during the Thirty Years’ War, Poland was the only country in Europe to have a different – “human and noble” – position. At the Council of Constance, held from 1414 to 1418 in the Bishopric of Constance in present-day Germany, Poland was the first to speak out against forced conversion; it preached respect for freedom in the sphere of religious beliefs before any other nation did. Earlier than other nations, it developed political freedoms and civil liberties. Poland came up with the idea that the world is trying to achieve today: the idea of the union of nations based on the principles of freedom, equality and mutual aid, without exploitation (Ciemniewski, 1917, pp. 10–11) – one example in the history of Poland was the Polish-Lithuanian Union (initiated in 1385, strengthened in 1569, and existing until 1795).

Against the background of these revived ideas, Ciemniewski strives to raise the value of work in education, emphasising economic skills, management and agriculture. He believes that education focused on aestheticism and shallow literature pushes it down the wrong path – the loss of economic skills limits the development of culture and undermines the basis of being (Ibidem, pp. 25–30). He perceives aesthetic culture as a harmony of beauty and form, linking its development with people’s emotions and creative imagination.

Ciemniewski defines intellectual culture as the flourishing of the nation’s creative abilities. He places knowledge and philosophy at the top and reliable education at the base. According to him, a “moral sense”, which takes the form of a sense of duty indicated by conscience and reason (Ciemniewski, 1919, p. 18, p. 31), is the most important factor in the ethical sphere. It is not



beneficial when we let “foreign strangers infiltrate our land, and we force our compatriots to emigrate overseas to find a shelter and bread – is it healthy patriotism?” (Ivi, p. 31). Where is humanitarianism and equality before the law?, he asks. School is a place where the social dimension of religion is fulfilled and it is to be the foundation of education. Education without religion becomes only a drill or training because education is primarily spiritualisation; the spiritual sphere should be able to rule our senses to make us live beautifully and nobly and to serve God and our homeland. Educational influence consists of combining divine and human elements.

Ciemniewski writes that religiousness is a feeling of admiration, worship, gratitude and adoration of God. This feeling precedes the knowledge of God. In his view, modernism opens up a path for subjectivism, relativism and, ultimately, extreme individualism. This will lead to complete anarchy on matters of faith.

Feeling is always subjective and individual views are sometimes mutually exclusive, so objective cognition is impossible under such conditions. Even internal experience will not help here because we do not examine the subject anymore, but our personal, subjective impressions that are different in every human being (Ivi, p. 68).

Like most pedagogues of culture, Ciemniewski is interested in character training. In the moral sense, to have character means:

to bring a certain ethical order to one’s conduct, a certain harmony and compliance with the law, and not to be guided by the changing impressions of the moment in relations with people, but to follow the voice of conscience and reason (*Ibidem*).

Therefore, character finds its meaning in social life. Ciemniewski agrees with Lucjan Zarzecki’s approach (1924, p. 191) that character is a constant and visible organisation of all forces given to man (characterised by a comprehensive ability to learn, the power of will and growing self-knowledge) in order to actively participate, together with one’s nation, in the life of the people, and to serve the nation and humankind. He refers to people with character as the conscience of the nation (Ciemniewski, 1927, vol. 1, pp. 29–31). In Ciemniewski’s concept the axis of education is the relationship between personality structures and culture as well as the current needs of the nation.

## 5. Leftist culturalism

The leftist profile of educational concepts is also present in the history of Polish pedagogical thought and is represented by Z. Mysłakowski and B. Suchodolski. Their concepts are the subject of many studies and interpretations

of Znaniecki's output from 1918 to 1939 can still be of interest today. Thus, when adopting the perspective of the pedagogy of culture (i.e. the relationship between personality structures and culture), we should answer the question of how the desired vision of a new civilisation can be achieved.

**The concept of Florian Znaniecki (1882–1958).** Znaniecki called his philosophy of social sciences *culturalism* (a philosophy of cultural sciences). Its meaning boils down to the thesis that the humanities and social sciences require a philosophical legitimacy. At this stage Znaniecki rejected naturalism and idealism as views on the living foundations of reality, just as he also rejected epistemological fundamentalism and positivism. Znaniecki's culturalism combined four concepts: (i) the theory of "concrete reality" (the way in which the subject of cultural sciences exists); (ii) the concept of the humanistic coefficient regarding the way in which this subject is examined (subjects of research are "always someone's, never anyone else's"); (iii) the theory of action being a culturalistic concept of subjectivity – action is directed at values, it reveals the subjective aspect of a concrete reality and allows recognising the presence of consciousness in the empirical world; and (iv) the concept of the sociology of knowledge regarded as a sub-discipline of sociology (but not a meta-theoretical reflection on cognition), and the knowledge of groups created by people. His project of the sociology of knowledge concerned the scientific community (Kuszyk-Bytniewska, 2008, pp. 957–961).

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In his work entitled *Ludzie terażniejsi a cywilizacja przyszłości* [Contemporary People and the Future Civilisation] (1934), Znaniecki develops a concept of a new civilisation which is regarded to be a humanistic utopia. Irena Wojnar points to its relationship with H. Bergson's work *L'évolution créatrice* [Creative Evolution] (1907), which she includes – referring to V. Cappalotti – in the trend of utopian tendencies that appeared in Europe in the 1930s. Moreover, she emphasises that the "new future civilisation" is the educational instantiation of an "open society" (Wojnar, 2001, pp. 34–47).<sup>3</sup>

What is this new civilisation supposed to be? Znaniecki answers that it will be all-human and different from national civilisations. It will also be a humanistic civilisation with a predominance of spiritual culture. Its other features include social harmony (no conflicts) and liquidity, meaning a dynamic balance containing free creativity as a normal function of individuals and groups. Moreover, it will be free from crises and created by new cultural systems. Only a humanistic, harmonious and liquid civilisation combining all these three features will be all-human (Znaniecki, 1974, p. 23).

Znaniecki also asks what is needed for the emergence of the new civilisation, the deepest essence of which is human creativity. In his view it can be originated by the creative efforts of people still belonging to this existing civilisation. However, it cannot be developed at its own pace and its forma-

3 Wojnar acknowledges the possible influence of Bergson's dichotomy: closed society–open society (Ibidem).

tion must be consistent with its future essence. The new civilisation requires conscious development of cultural forces which are essential for its existence. Therefore, there is an urgent need to form people who are to become the people of the future (Ivi, pp. 96-98).

To create a new civilisation a new man is needed, and to create him the present man must be known. In this creation, both present and future people have their roles, and the circles of life (educational environments) are instructed who they should shape: Znaniecki asks neither parents nor educators about it. Those who want the new civilisation know the answer – they will say how they should act. The new civilisation cannot be created without the support of science and the resulting practice.

Evolution management is to be based on the ideals of culture, humanistic values and moral principles, and for this to happen they must be inscribed in the ideal of education.

Thus, the vision of the new civilisation is the criterion for what makes up the ideal of education. Znaniecki tries to indicate the means to build it. He is creative, choosing values and developing a strategy. He acts like a pedagogue of culture, the means of which are the following:

1. Personality. This is how he formulates the concept of a cultural personality:

The cultural personality of an ordinary man, who lives from the cradle to the grave as a member of a cultural group and a participant in the civilisation of society, which is subordinated to this civilisation, is extremely rich and complex, even at the level of folk civilisations. It [civilisation] consists of all the activities that this person performs and all the data that they encounter in their lifetime, taking a significant part in cultural systems (Ivi, p. 101).

Cultural systems are the food and the grounds for and the content of personality. This fact is the principal factor for understanding the educational process as it happens in culture. However, science lacks a cultural personality theory, so Znaniecki attempts to develop it through creative exploration of psychology and the theory of culture. For this purpose, he looks for external inspirations and refers to E. Spranger (*Lebensformen*, Halle (1927)), thus entering the main direction of development of cultural educational science in Europe.

2. The teacher. According to Znaniecki, a pedagogue is not a guide to the world of values:

It is not possible to entrust the education of a young generation only to “pedagogues”, the well-mannered people, or leave their social organisation to “activists” ... even the wisest ones ... Only supernormal perverts, who have the necessary initiative and creative vigour, can prevail in joint action (Ivi, pp. 358-359).

Further, he writes about the need to create a new type of normality – creating himself, the new man should not start with himself but with this new civilisation, on the development of which all his interests will focus.

3. Environment. In this concept, the social circle receives the right to exert pressure that inhibits or inspires creativity to push the exuberant individuality in the most desirable direction and to make it a co-creator and companion for others. Admittedly, Znaniecki adds elsewhere, every group should be influenced by an individual, but again he precedes this statement with the following: an individual must be influenced by a group that expects specific creativity from them. He describes the properties of social circles that should surround an individual in childhood and youth. The most important issue is that the social and cultural functions of the circles should undergo significant modifications (Ivi, pp. 365–367). For example, the family circle, while maintaining the functions of a physical care provider, should be only a circle of entertainment for an adolescent:

[This should be] socialising, rather than political or fighting entertainment, without a fight for power and without discipline. This is the only way to neutralise the cultural impact of the family [emphasised by the author] ... Let parents forget their full responsibility for the future of their children and leave the matter of their upbringing to other circles (Ivi, pp. 368–369).

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4. Context. Znaniecki made a “suggestive attempt to categorise various types of ‘contemporary people’ to show that they cannot be the creators of the ideal new civilisation outlined” (Wojnar, 2001, p. 45). He attributed a special role to the social personality, and not to the cognitive personality, and dedicated his theory to it. The social personality will determine man’s readiness for the new civilisation. To create his theory he also used the “margins” of the old theory and its category of supernormality (and subnormality). He reached for the phenomenon of supernormality, for people who deviate from the accepted norms, because the supernormal were always the creators of new qualities who went beyond existing boundaries. Now the supernormal “perverts” must gain their creative vigour and independence without rebellion against the new order and without breaking the norms. Znaniecki did not say that he expected change from them; they are to be pillars and the force that will sustain the new civilisation (Znaniecki, 1974, p. 346). According to him, the duration of its spiritual system will depend on the cultural fertility of its people.

Znaniecki considered the matter of directing change to be a burning issue. According to him, a group that realises that the next generations would have to be able to consciously manage social evolution was the team from the Teachers College at Columbia University: Dewey, Kilpatrick, Russell, Bagley, Brunner, and others (Ivi, p. 5). Not touching upon the deeper aspects of the proposed civilisation, he wrote, “we have to think about cultural ideals

for the implementation of which we want to prepare the new generations” (Ivi, pp. 5-6). Not only this but also the previous thoughts put an individual in the background, making them subordinate. The comprehensive framework of the concept shows that Znaniecki’s vision results from his belief in social engineering, and its implementation is to be preceded by great educational engineering. Znaniecki joined the humanists who wanted to form a new, “better” world by “creating” a new man. He did not avoid utopia and he was not the only one to deal with this subject (the phenomenon of utopias was later debunked and criticised in George Orwell’s works).

## Conclusion

The withdrawal from subjectivism in educational theory and practice is characteristic of the pedagogy of culture [Germ. *geisteswissenschaftliche Pädagogik*]. The goals of education and their sources are external to pupils and constitute an objective reality they are meant to grow up in. This cultural “material” does not necessarily have to reflect the individuality of the pupils, yet this kind of pedagogy wants to leave them with the maximum amount of freedom (which individual concepts do not always respect) to allow the internal development of their personalities and enable them to achieve autonomy. Both freedom and coercion appear on the path of this development, and both of these educational measures are considered to be necessary. Getting to know culture and accepting its values (experiencing their related states), including them in one’s own axionormative system (with the postulate of autonomy), crowned with creativity in all areas of activity are the goals and the most general essence of the pedagogy of culture. They are present in the three directions discussed in this article. In these directions, however, the autonomy of man is not absolute (complete) as man stands before God, or a vision developed by the creators of a “better” world.

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