

Meta-Physika

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The concrete relationship between *tà phusiká* and *tà metà tà phusiká* is here investigated in relation to Emanuele Severino's enquiry into the originary structure of the truth of being. The question of that relationship is linked to some of the principal elements of Severino's enquiry: the abstraction of appearing from the appearing of appearing, the abstraction of the will from the world and from the contents willed by the will, and, precisely, the abstraction of *tà phusiká* from *tà metà tà phusiká*.

Keywords:

Emanuele Severino, Physics, Metaphysics, Originary Structure

1. Tà Phusiká and tà Metà tà Phusiká

The question of the concrete relation between *tà phusiká* and *tà metà tà phusiká* may be argued to lie at the heart of Severino's reflection. The question concerning this relation is the question of whether those beings that immediately appear, and appear as *becoming* (*phúsis*, *tà phusiká*), effectively constitute the *totality* of beings that are — or whether, on the contrary, any positive determinacy (*tà metà tà phusiká*) may be argued to lie beyond the immediate presence of what presently and manifestly appears.

This question appears to drive Severino's own reflection (from an earliest time onwards)¹, as well as, consistently, the earliest enquiry of philosophy as accounted for by Severino himself. This consonance is certainly not incidental, and testifies to the internal consistency of Severino's reflection. That is to say, on the one hand, Severino makes his own what he regards as the essential question of philosophy throughout the history of the West; and, conversely, he reads the history of Western philosophy as ensuing from what appears to him as the most essential question. (In Hegelian terms, it might be said that it is no accident that the element that drives the unfolding of the *Phenomenology* should coincide with the element that lies at the heart of the *Logic* — granted that the terms “phenomenology” and “logic” come to assume an unprecedented meaning as part of Severino's reflection, and so does that “element”, i.e. that contradiction, that lies at the heart of both that “phenomenology” and that “logic”).

Insofar as the enquiry of philosophy turns to, and addresses, the Whole — the totality of beings — it cannot avoid asking the question of the relationship between *tà phusiká* and *tà metà tà phusiká*: that is to say, the en-

1 One may for instance refer to the essay “Aristotle and Classical Metaphysics” (Severino, 1958; 2005), as well as to *La struttura originaria*, Chap. XIII (Severino 1981) and *The Essence of Nihilism* (Severino, 2016).

quiry of philosophy must ask whether the totality of beings that are immediately present constitutes the totality *simpliciter* of being itself, or whether any positive determinacy exceeds this immediately present totality. The enquiry of philosophy must ask this question even when, with the Pre-Socratics — and, arguably, after the different “destructions” and “deconstructions” of metaphysics and of its history — it asserts that there is *no* dimension of being that exceeds the manifest becoming of the world. In this instance, the enquiry of philosophy concludes that *phúsis* itself — the ever-changing (*phúo*) dimension of what appears and is manifest (*pháinesthai*) — coincides with the totality of being (**b^huH-*, from which *phúo*, *phúsis*, *pháinesthai*, *phôs*, etc. constituting one of the Indo-European roots of “being”). The pre-Socratics, accordingly, insofar as they regard the becoming of the world as constituting the totality of the *kósmos* (i.e. of *phúsis*) — are then *phusikoi* (Aristotle, *Physics*, 184b 17). (“And yet”, Severino argues, “from the standpoint of these ‘physicists’, who did not suspect the existence of any reality beyond that of the world, enquiring into the world did not mean confining themselves to a consideration of a particular dimension of the whole, but it meant exhibiting the very concrete content or the very all-encompassing determination of the whole itself. Hence, they set out precisely to enquire into the principles of *all things*. This means that they addressed the notion of totality *qua* totality — albeit thinking that the world itself was that totality; in this respect, they have not been physicists, but metaphysicians”; Severino, 1981, p. 532). Analogously, at the other end of the history of Western metaphysics, Nietzsche’s “faithfulness to the earth” (“I beseech you, my brothers, *remain faithful to the earth* and do not believe those who speak to you of extraterrestrial hopes!”, Nietzsche, 2006, p. 6) constitutes precisely a refutation of every metaphysical dimension; this very refutation coincides with the “physics” of the creators, i.e. the ones who have left metaphysics behind (§ 335 of the *The Gay Science*, titled “Long live physics!”, states: “We must become *physicists* in order to be creators — while hitherto all valuations and ideals have been built on *ignorance* of physics or in *contradiction* to it. So, long live physics!” Nietzsche, 2001, p. 189).

The question of the concrete relation between *tà phusiká* and *tà metá tà phusiká* is then confronted by Severino as *the* question to be addressed by the enquiry of philosophy. According to Severino, the originary truth of being contains — and must contain — within itself the answer to that question. The entirety of *La struttura originaria* moves towards that answer — an answer that is reached in the last chapter of that work. In fact, Sev-

erino notes (*La struttura originaria*, Chap. XI), the appearing of that question must itself appear together with its answer: for the very answer to the question of the concrete relation between *tà phusiká* and *tà metà tà phusiká* constitutes a positive determinacy that *does not* appear, as of yet, as part of the totality of what is immediately present, and it is therefore a determinacy that *exceeds* that dimension (the dimension of *tà phusiká*) — thus already answering the question of whether *tà phusiká* coincides with the totality *simpliciter* of being. This is the case *even if* “what exceeds the immediate is only the verification that nothing exceeds the immediate” (Severino, 1981, p. 475). This argument, however, only provides a positive and yet indeterminate answer to the question of the concrete relation between *tà phusiká* and *tà metà tà phusiká*, for the — possibly complex — *content* of the determinacy that exceeds the dimension of *tà phusiká* still remains to be determined. This is the task of the last chapter of *La struttura originaria*.

The title of Chapter XIII of *La struttura originaria* reads: “Originary Metaphysics” [*La metafisica originaria*]. That is to say, the result towards which the entirety of *La struttura originaria* moves is the determination of the *originary* dimension that — originarily — exceeds the dimension of what is immediately present and becoming. In other words, the fundamental result of *La struttura originaria* is the determination of the *originary* meta-physical dimension (“*metafisica originaria*”) that exceeds the present and becoming dimension of *tà phusiká*. The title of Paragraph 21 of Chapter XIII of *La struttura originaria* reads: “L-Immediacy of the Assertion that a Positive Determinacy Exceeds the Totality of the F-Immediate”². Severino writes:

The concrete positing of the L-immediacy of the following proposition is thus achieved: “A positive determinacy exceeds the totality of the F-immediate” — a positing that so far had only been indeterminately anticipated. Accordingly: the originary structure is determined as the assertion that the immutable whole exceeds the totality of the F-immediate — that is, it exceeds the originary structure itself (insofar as every element of the originary is a moment of the totality of the F-immediate). In this respect, the originary struc-

2 “L-immediacy” and “F-immediacy” indicate, respectively, Severino’s notions of logical and phenomenological immediacy.

ture constitutes the concrete and originary opening of metaphysical knowledge. (Severino, 1981, p. 545).

This positive determinacy is the eternity of the concrete totality of being — of each and every being: *tà metà tà phusiká*. What is present, and is present as “becoming”, may appear *only* insofar as the concrete structure of the Whole *does not* coincide with the immediate totality of what presently appears as becoming. There exists a dimension (*tà metà tà phusiká*) that exceeds, includes and makes possible the becoming of the world (*tà phusiká*) (“The immutable is not simply *that without which* the becoming of reality is not, but it is *that by virtue of which* that reality is”, Severino, 1981, p. 553).

Let us quote the entirety of Paragraph 30 of Chapter XIII of *La struttura originaria*, titled “The Nature of the Relation between the Immutable and Becoming”:

The totality of the F-immediate, and, more generally, the totality of becoming beings, *is* only insofar as the immutable whole is: asserting that only the horizon of becoming is — that is, asserting that the totality of becoming coincides with the totality of being — entails asserting that being is not; the horizon of becoming, thus understood (that is, as a positive determinacy that *is* even if the immutable is not) is self-contradictory, and it is therefore nothing. The horizon of becoming — namely, of everything that presently becomes, may become or may have become — can therefore be only insofar as the immutable whole is. (*ibid.*).

(Granted that it has already been established that “this immutability does not pertain to this or to that being, but to *every* being”, *ibid.*, p. 547). Originary meta-physics is then the dimension of being that originally exceeds the dimension of immediately present being.

Phenomenology

While the concrete foundation of the relationship between *tà phusiká* and *tà metà tà phusiká* may not be discussed in detail here, let us briefly present the way in which, according to Severino, that relationship determines, in a most essential way, the unfolding of the history of the West (that is, let us leave aside for now the question of the “logic” of the relationship be-

tween *tà phusiká* and *tà metá tà phusiká*, and let us take up that of its “phenomenology”).

As already remarked, philosophy consists, since its inception, in that form of thinking and questioning that turns to the Whole. However, insofar as the totality of what is immediately present, manifest and becoming is taken to coincide with the Whole itself, philosophy consists in a form of “physics” or “cosmology”: that is to say, the enquiry into the truth of the Whole coincides with the enquiry into that dimension of being that becomes and that is immediately present in its becoming. This is the fundamental stance that appears to characterise both the philosophical enquiry of the Pre-Socratics (namely, the philosophical enquiry that precedes the positing of a dimension of being that exceeds the dimension of *phúsis*) and the philosophical enquiry that follows the “destruction” of the dimension of being that exceeds the dimension of *phúsis* (the “destruction of the immutables”). In both instances, philosophy comes to coincide with a (generalised) form of physics or cosmology: namely, with a determination of the order (*kósmos*) of the cosmos — i.e. of the manifest and becoming totality of beings. These two moments of the history of philosophy, however, essentially differ from one another; they do so precisely insofar as, in one of them, humans have not yet experienced the remedy of philosophy “proper” (the remedy of the *epísteme* or “meta-physics”), while, in the other one — having experienced that remedy — they *know* that this remedy is in fact worse than the ill and the danger that were supposed to be remedied. That danger is the danger of annihilation, and that ill is the ill of the anxiety induced by that annihilation.

The domain of *phúsis* immediately appears to humans in its becoming: human beings themselves, in fact, coincide precisely with the appearing of that dimension. That is to say, the site of the appearing of *phúsis* — of *tà phusiká* — is abstracted (i.e. abstractly separated) from *phúsis* itself (or, equivalently, the site of the “appearing” of *phúsis* is abstractly separated from the site of its “being”). Humans thus bear witness to the becoming of *phúsis*: namely, to the becoming of *every* being and *every* thing. Accordingly, humans infer that they, themselves — as the site of the appearing of that becoming — are destined to become, and perish away. The appearing of the danger of their own annihilation is accompanied by an abyssal form of anxiety.

That annihilation becomes irreversible the very moment humans accomplish and achieve (or, rather, believe to accomplish and achieve) their abstraction from *phúsis*. For, as Severino recalls, in the age of myths, hu-

mans still perceive themselves and their actions as being part of the Whole: in this respect, their perishing does not strictly speaking constitute an annihilation (the cyclic structure of time marking the possibility of their return). As soon as their abstraction from the totality of *phúsis* is complete, however, their annihilation becomes irreversible; as soon as they invoke the ontological meaning of being and nothingness (precisely insofar as they believe that they are *not* the Whole), they also invoke the ontological meaning of becoming, which consists in a transition from being to nothingness and from nothingness to being. Thus, by invoking the ontological meaning of being and nothingness in order to abstract themselves from the immediately present becoming of *phúsis*, humans are delivered over to a final and irreversible annihilation. The constantly imminent danger of this annihilation is accompanied by a constantly immanent anxiety. (“There exists a — historical, or even just ‘ideal’ — place where the Greek invocation of becoming brings about the most extreme form of anxiety: the anxiety induced by nothingness — the nothingness to which humans and things fall prey.” Severino, 1992, p. 128).

That is to say, in order to have power, the human will must abstract itself from the Whole by which it feels limited and constrained. It is only insofar as the will abstracts itself from the Whole through the invocation of the ontological meaning of being and nothingness, of identity and difference, that it is *free*: it is free from the Whole, insofar as “the will *is* the will and it is *not* the Whole”, and it is a *free* will insofar as it may bring into being what is not (“We see that the principle of what will be [*archè tôn esoménon*] lies in deliberating and doing something [*kai apò toû bouleúesthai kai apò toû praxai ti*], and we see that, in general, in things that are not always actual, there is the possibility of being and of not being [*tò dunatòn einai kai mé*]”; *De Interpretatione*, 19a 8). And yet, it is precisely insofar as the will invokes the ontological meaning of being and nothingness in order to acquire an “ontological” power that the will itself is swept over by the ontological meaning of its own becoming and annihilation.

Confronted with their own irreversible annihilation, humans come to posit a dimension of being that exceeds the becoming of *phúsis* — the becoming of the manifest *phainesthai* — and which is thus *metà-phúsis*. This is the dimension of being from which what appears originates, and into which, after disappearing, it returns (*ex hōn dè he génésis esti toîs oûsi, kai tèn phtoràn eis taúta gínesthai*, Anaximander, fr. 1). Insofar as this dimension exceeds the immediate and becoming appearing of *phúsis*, it is immutable and non-becoming: “Meta-physics is equivalent, precisely, to the

episteme that, starting with *phúsis* – namely, with the self-evidence of becoming – moves beyond becoming by invoking the dimension of the immutables” (Severino 2023, p.18). According to Severino, the history of philosophy, *qua* history of meta-physics, consists precisely in the positing of the different forms taken by these immutable beings. The immutable beings, Severino writes, include “the god of the Greek-Christian tradition, the god of modern immanentism, the natural order and the natural law, the natural good and the natural beauty, the immortal soul of human beings, the authority and the teachings of the ‘Son of God’ and of the Church, the authority of the master, of the monarch and of the State, the relations of production in the capitalist economy, the moral law, the determinism of nature, the dialectic rationality of history, the irreversibility of time, and communist society as outcome of the class struggle.” (Severino, 2023, p. 9).

Philosophy posits this dimension of being beyond the manifest becoming of *phúsis* in order to contain and remedy the anxiety induced by becoming: that is, in order to safeguard a dimension of being in which humans may (at least partially) be saved. Humans, however, find within themselves a power that resembles the creative and innovatory power of the becoming of *phúsis*: the power of the will. (And yet, humans do not see that they partake of the same creative and original power of *phúsis* precisely because they originarily and concretely belong within *phúsis* itself. The will sees that it contains a principle of *phúsis* inside itself — i.e. an *archè kinéseos kaì metabolês*, Aristotle, *Physics*, 200b 12 — but, rather than seeing in this principle a residue of its impossible abstraction from *phúsis*, it believes to have power and control over this principle: that is, over its own freedom). Humans identify with that power, and begin to perceive as oppressive everything that could constrain or restrain the freedom of that power: namely, everything that, in being immutable, could resist the creative and destructive power of the will. Insofar as every immutable being — posited by philosophy in order to remedy the anxiety induced by becoming — limits the power of the will, it limits the will to power; insofar as every immutable being does *not* become, it negates becoming itself — and, therefore, the will: the will must therefore refute and negate every immutable being. According to Severino, the last two centuries have borne witness to the destruction of every immutable being and of every form of meta-physics.

As a result, humans have thus had to find a new remedy against the anxiety induced by the becoming of *phúsis* — a becoming that always threatens to sweep them away from existence. Humans have therefore

turned to the Apparatus of science and technics. That is to say, after trying the epistemic-theological Apparatus, or the “remedy of truth”, they have turned to “the remedy of untruth” (“Any possible remedy cannot but be an apparatus of truth or an apparatus of untruth”, Severino, 1992, p. 55). Accordingly, humans have come to refute every limit to the power of the will, and they have set out to indefinitely increase that power through the means at their disposal³. The scientifico-technological Apparatus consists in the endeavour to indefinitely increase the power of the will — and, in particular, to indefinitely increase the power of the will to defend itself from the annihilating danger of becoming. The will thus leaves behind the epistemic power of the immutable beings, and relies only on its own power to set up barriers against the destructive force of becoming. It therefore aims to indefinitely increase its own power to set up those barriers, and thus create a domain in which it may feel safe from the danger of becoming. (Insofar as the will of the scientifico-technological Apparatus consists in a deployment of the power to *set up* barriers against the destructive power of becoming, that will and that Apparatus may be said to constitute a form of *Ge-stell*, albeit in a radically different sense from the one discussed by Heidegger in e.g. *Die Frage nach der Technik*). The scientifico-technological apparatus thus aims to extend the domain in which it may feel safe from the danger of becoming, and to indefinitely increase its power to preserve and extend that domain.

In the age of Technics, philosophy, *qua* remedy against the danger of becoming, comes to constitute an enquiry into the conditions of possibility for an indefinite increase in the power of the will. Insofar as the condition of possibility of that indefinite increase is the destruction of every meta-physical dimension, philosophy consists first of all in a “theory” (namely, a “seeing”) of the “necessity” of that destruction (a “necessity”, however, that presupposes the ontological separation of the will from the Whole, as well as the resulting ontological meaning of becoming). Philosophy and the Apparatus of science and Technics thus come to have the same goal: to ensure the theoretical and practical realisation of the salvation of the will — a realisation that first of all entails a destruction of every immutable being that could threaten to limit the power of the will. Phi-

3 The shift from the epistemic-theological Apparatus to the scientifico-technological one entails an essential shift in the structure of predictions operated by that very Apparatus, see (Severino, 2023).

losophy, science, and Technics come to represent different aspects of the same endeavour, and move towards the theoretical and practical unification of their procedures.

Logic

The dialectical unfolding of the contradiction of *tà phusiká* and *tà metá tà phusiká* may not result in a reconciliation or supersession of that contradiction: that is to say, the will may never come to have power over the totality of *phúsis*, and thus definitively be safe from the danger of its own annihilation. For, regardless of how far the will may succeed in extending the domain over which it believes to exert its power, the will is always and necessarily abstracted from its own willing what it wills. That is to say, the will may will a certain content, but it may not, at the same time, will to will it (Schopenhauer already writes: “According to the empirical concept of freedom we can say ‘I am free, if I can *do what I will*’, and there, in this ‘what I will’, freedom is already decided. But now, given that we are enquiring about the freedom of *willing* itself, this question would accordingly frame itself thus: ‘Can you also *will* what you will? [*Kannst du auch wollen, was du willst?*]’”, “On the Freedom of the Will”, Schopenhauer, 2009, p. 34)⁴. Regardless of how far the will may succeed in expanding the dimension of what can become part of its content (namely, of what it can will) — and even if the will were (to believe) to be able to will the very totality of the whole — the will would nevertheless be unable to will its own willing what it wills.

The will is thus always powerless in relation to what remains outside of its control, and this domain always includes at least the will’s very self-will. This residual and external dimension, however, comes to constitute the utmost danger for the will, for it threatens an irreversible annihilation of everything that the will believes to have secured. This danger is all the more threatening the more the will believes to have extended the domain over which it can exert its power: for the more the will believes to have obtained

4 This is due to the very structure of abstraction, according to which the abstract is always abstracted from its own abstraction or abstract-being (i.e. a being is abstracted from its own being, identity is abstracted from its self-identity, etc.): and the will is abstracted from its self-will.

and secured, the more it is liable to lose. Accordingly, Severino argues, every increase in the safety obtained by the will coincides with an increase in the danger and anxiety of irreversibly losing it (“Every increase in happiness constitutes, at the same time, an incubation of this extreme form of anxiety”, Severino, 1992, p. 55). In particular, once humans will have believed to be safe from the possibility of their own annihilation or death, that anxiety will come to exceed its present form: for, once the will should believe to be safe from death itself, there would arise a danger and an anxiety over the annihilation not only of the “life” of the will, but of the very “immortality” that the will should believe to have secured. According to Severino, the will still needs to confront the abyss of the terror of losing not only its “life”, but its very “immortality”. (And, therefore, the will still needs to confront the abyss of willing — i.e. of believing to will — a form of “suicide” that would entail relinquishing not only its “life, but its very “immortality”).

This “dialectic” of history — driven by the contradiction between the dimension of “*phúsis*” and that of “*metà-phúsis*” — however, *presupposes* the ontological abstraction of the will from the Whole, and the ontological meaning of becoming that results from it. That is to say, that dialectic (namely, that contradiction) presupposes the very *self*-contradiction of a will that is, on the one hand, *metà-phúsis*, insofar as it is abstracted from *phúsis*, and, on the other hand, it is itself (or it includes) a principle of creative and free becoming — i.e. of *phúsis*. Concurrently, that dialectic presupposes the very *self*-contradiction of a *phúsis* that is both a site of becoming, *and*, as a whole, a totality that does not become (i.e. that it is *metà-phúsis*). The contradiction that drives the “dialectic” of history thus presupposes the very *self*-contradiction of its two abstract moments (which are self-contradictory precisely insofar as they are abstract). That is to say, that dialectic presupposes the ontological abstraction of the will from the Whole: an abstraction that results in the two abstract and self-contradictory notions of *tà phusiká* and *tà metà tà phusiká*.

Returning to the relation between “logic” and “phenomenology”, it follows from these “phenomenological” considerations that there can be no future reconciliation of the originary abstraction of the will from the totality of *phúsis*: that is, there can be no future reconciliation of the originary contradiction between *phúsis* and the will *qua* dimension that is (at least provisionally) *metà-phúsis*. The impossibility of this reconciliation pertains to the “structure” or “logic” of the concrete relation between *tà phusiká* and *tà metà tà phusiká*. For, in fact, what is first of all impossible is not that

reconciliation, but the very originary abstraction of the will from the concrete totality of the Whole — an abstraction that constitutes the originary meaning of impossibility. The contradiction between *tà phusiká* and *tà metà tà phusiká* may not be reconciled at the end point of any “historical” or “phenomenological” development because that contradiction *may not* appear as part of the concrete Whole itself. Severino shows that it is only insofar as that contradiction is *originarily* negated in and by the concrete Whole that it may abstractly appear: that is to say, that it may appear to be abstracted from its own negation (see e.g. Severino 2005). Every abstraction is originarily negated in and by the Whole, and it may abstractly appear only insofar as it has been abstracted — “isolated” — from that negation (in the same way in which the contradiction “the circle is square” may appear only insofar as “the circle” is *not* “square”, for, if “the circle” were “square”, that contradiction would not be a contradiction, but an identity). Therefore, what appears, according to Severino, is *not* the “history” of the separation and reconciliation of *tà phusiká* and *tà metà tà phusiká*, but the “history” of the *belief* in — or the *will* of — that separation. The content of that belief and of that will is originarily negated (for that content is nothing, error, *nihil absolutum*) and may not appear, but that belief or that will (*qua* “positive meaning of nothingness”) can and does appear (*qua* erring). The history of the concrete relationship between *tà phusiká* and *tà metà tà phusiká* is therefore the history of the *belief* in their separation (the history of “nihilism”, or the history of the “isolated earth”) — a history that comes to an end with the end of the appearing of that belief (and not with the end of that impossible separation).

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As abstractly separated from one another, *phúsis* and the will (namely, the phenomenon and its *pháinesthai*; abstract appearing and abstract appearing of appearing) coincide with the abstract notions of *tà phusiká* and *tà metà tà phusiká*. The *concrete* structure of the abstraction of *tà phusiká* and *tà metà tà phusiká* — i.e. the “originary structure” — determines the abstract appearing of both *tà phusiká* and *tà metà tà phusiká*. Elsewhere, we aim to identify “originary metaphysics” with the *concrete* structure of classical *metaphysica generalis*, and the abstractions of *tà phusiká* (“*cosmologia rationalis*”), *tà metà tà phusiká* (“*psychologia rationalis*”), and their contradictory identity (“*theologia rationalis*”) with the three abstract domains of

classical *metaphysica specialis*. (“This unyielding iris of appearing is thus a structure, in the sense that it is the appearing of the appearing of appearing. But these three *are the same* appearing [...]” Severino, 1981, p. 92). The project (*Metà-Phusiká*) thus opens up of relating the structure of the abstraction of concreteness to the necessary determinations of the abstract appearing of the world (*kósmos*), of the will (*psuché*), and of their abstract contradiction (*theós*). The three originary abstractions, however, are not the unconditioned ideas of Kant’s Transcendental Dialectic: a “*focus imaginarius*” (Kant 1998, A 644/B 672) “hypostatized” by reason as an unconditioned element at the end of a sequence of conditioned experiences. (Accordingly, Kant could find no “transition” [*Übergang*] from the Metaphysical Foundations to Physics [*Übergang von den Metaphysischen Anfangsgründen der Naturwissenschaft zur Physik*], as he sought at length after his Critiques; Kant 1993). Rather, the originary identity of *tà phusiká*, *tà metà tà phusiká* and their identity consists in that originary “moment (*Augenblick*) in which the shores of physics and metaphysics make contact with each other (*Styx interfusa*)” (Kant, 1938, p. 487). The originary identity of *tà phusiká*, *tà metà tà phusiká* and their identity (“*This iris which coincides with present and actual appearing [...] The fixed iris in which the eternal spectacle of Necessity comes to light; Severino, 1981, p. 92*) thus coincides with that originary meta-physics whose abstraction into *tà phusiká* and *tà metà tà phusiká* represents the originary meaning of impossibility — i.e. that originary meta-physics that constitutes the singular meaning of present appearing (i.e. the meaning of meaning, the presence of presence, the appearing of appearing).

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