

The Silence of Becoming

Severino, Husserl and Time-Consciousness

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With its several problems and *its aporetic nature*, the absolute intimacy between consciousness and time highlighted by Husserl's reflections rightly belongs in the discussion of the dimension of profound persuasion, the unconscious faith in the becoming of time and its rootedness in the *Essence of Western Nihilism*, described by Emanuele Severino in his works: the nihilistic unconscious that things are nothing, the unconscious persuasion that there is a *time* in which being and nothing coincide, a *time* in which the impossible is given, that a being is and also is not, that the self is different from self. As regards the Nihilistic meaning of Becoming, the faith in becoming different of the beings, is the continuous process of the *death* of what becomes different until real death, physical death in the sense of the extinction of any Becoming. And this brings us back to the crucial topic of the phenomenology of Husserlian time. The re-emerging through memory, the re-presentation of the present past of *time-consciousness* is not simply a ghost of what has been. But this becoming, the repetition of the present in something else through the *retentional modification* enacted by memory, inevitably stops in the face of death, the *absolute modification* of no long being able to become.

Keywords

Time, Faith, Becoming, Phenomenology, Death, Eternity

1.

In the understanding of Husserl's phenomenology, the question of time is one of the most important characteristics. Husserl's crucial theme of transcendental subjectivity and the intentional structure that characterises it cannot in any way be set aside from the essential fact that it is both constituent and constituted in time-consciousness. Time-consciousness, in the phenomenological meaning that progressively emerges during Husserl's reflections from 1905 on in his lessons, is the result of an analysis that *eliminates* objective time with all the affirmations concerning it. Husserl's intention in this analysis was to enclose the real *worldly time* of the natural sciences and psychology, so that the experience of time is understood in its purity as the immanent *flow* to consciousness: this is "assuming a time that is, but this is not the time of world experience but rather the *immanent time* of the flow of consciousness" (Husserl, 1969, p. 5).

This is not, however, an undifferentiated flow. The assumption of the flow of consciousness theme in Husserl should be understood in accordance with Merleau-Ponty's declarations in the *Phenomenology of Perception*: "time presupposes an overview of time. It is therefore not like a river, it is not a substance that flows. The fact that this metaphor has been able to survive since Heraclitus until today, is because we furtively put a testimony of its flow in the river" (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. 470). Husserl's *view* is both reflexive and descriptive: reflexive through its exercising of the reduction that reveals the intentional structure in which and through which experience objects are constituted; descriptive, in rendering the details of the structural elements, the eidetic forms underlying the creation of experience objects, and the phenomena in their giving themselves in the respective intentional acts of consciousness:

What comes under the field of phenomenology is none other than the description *that* specific acts *intend* [...] the detection of the a

priori truths that belong to different constitutive moments of objectivity. As far as *the a priori of time* is concerned, we try to clarify it by scouring *time-consciousness*, highlighting the essential constitution and extracting any graspable contents and character acts specifically concerning time, to which the time laws basically belong [...] I am referring to laws of an obvious nature such as the following: that stable, temporal order is an infinite two-dimensional series, that their relationship is irreversible, that transitivity exists, that each time has a before and after, etc. (Husserl, 1969, p. 10).

The phenomenological approach thus differs clearly from that of the natural sciences and for Husserl objective time must therefore be excluded (cf. Husserl, 1969, § 1). It is through this operation that the consciousness of immanent time emerges as the consciousness of pure experiences, which are intentional experiences that are headed towards the temporal determinations of an immanent object. And in virtue of this correlation, each objectual temporal determination has to express itself as an intentional act.

Initially the analysis of time-consciousness is carried out following the graspable content of grasping the transcendent perception pattern, according to which the object is perceived in its totality, as it is possible to perceive directly only its particular (verifiable) aspects, and its adumbrations. Similarly, the analysis of immanent time, that of temporal objects and their duration implies that, owing to its own completeness, each current phase of perception refers in continuation to the past phase by means of retention and to the future one by means of protention. On the basis of this graspable scheme the memory would be what makes past realities progressively reappear in the shadow and then disperse in the continuous alternation of retentions.

In this analysis, the temporal object has two meanings for Husserl: one in the broader and one in the stricter sense. In the broader sense it refers to any perceived object (for example, a tree in the garden, a lit lamp, etc.) that appears in time and occupies a defined *now* in a spatial relationship of there compared to the absolute here of my lived body (*Leib*) and it is a synthetic unit, a unitary apprehension, an apperception of those essentially partial outlines, those perceptive shadows that can gradually be verified, through which the perceived object is offered. On the other hand, the stricter sense refers to an individual perceptive object that intrinsically contains a temporal extension, a duration, the parts of which are distributed over time (for example, that of a succession of notes in a melody). Both meanings, however, require an act of objectivising consciousness, as a form

of apprehension rather than a mere sensation. An analysis of the intentional activity of time-consciousness thus requires a description of how temporal objects are constituted in perceptive acts of consciousness. This means a three-fold interweaving of intentional correlation: the perception object that is currently remembered was present as perceived in the past and the object of future expectation will be understood as an object of present perception. The essential characteristic of this operation is the discovery that it is the present that takes place within a continuous web that binds and links these different threads of time.

However, from the lessons in the 1906-1907 winter semester on (Husserl, 1969, §39, pp. 106-109), this description is gradually transformed, with the introduction of the idea of a consciousness of absolute time, of pure intentionality in which consciousness *retains*, keeping the temporal object and, *simultaneously, retains itself*: it retains the past objects in the present and retains itself in what no longer exists. Husserl calls this retention of the past duration of the temporal object transversal intentionality (*Querintentionalität*) and the retention of the past flow of the absolute consciousness, longitudinal intentionality (*Längsintentionalität*). For Husserl, these two intentionalities form an indissoluble unit in which the temporality of the relationship in itself and the relationship with the objects is closely related: “interwoven in the unique flow of consciousness there are therefore *two intentionalities* that are inextricably united and reciprocally necessary as two sides of the same thing” (Husserl 1969, p. 109). It therefore emerges as the consciousness of an object in time whilst at the same time the consciousness of myself as an experience of time; this therefore means describing the constitution of the temporal objects in the perceptive acts in the light of the temporality of the perceptive, constituent acts themselves. The consciousness of an intentional object is also conscious of itself, *self-conscious*, but *absolutely* and not in an objectivising manner. In this sense, immanent consciousness is a *manifestation of itself*: it gives itself without there being any distance between its apparition and its reality. And in this sense, time-consciousness must therefore always be understood as time-consciousness *and*, also as time of consciousness; in other words, it is a circular description that leads to the phenomenological theme of the *self-manifestation* of consciousness: an absolute consciousness of time that retains itself and is in *itself* retaining.

2.

Consciousness of temporal succession is therefore impossible if there is no tie between past and present perception. According to Husserl, “It is clear that the actual perception of a temporal object is of a temporal nature, that the perception of the duration in turn presupposes the duration of perception, and that the perception of any temporal figure also has its own temporal figure”. A first level of the interior time-consciousness exists in which each moment of perception is already given a duration of the temporal object, and in which the duration of the perception makes it possible to follow the temporal object as it continuously unfolds. Thanks to the fact that a duration of the temporal object already exists at each moment of perception, the duration of perception therefore makes it possible to follow the temporal object in its continuous and living unfolding, as is the case, for example, in the perception of the duration of a sound compared to a melody. However, a second level also emerges, a last layer of consciousness that Husserl calls the “flow of the absolute, constitutive consciousness of time” (Husserl, 1969, p. 101). This level is transformed into the absolute consciousness of time; it is absolute because it constitutes different immanent temporal objects, it is the condition of possibility and is therefore in its turn not constituted, it is not within time, and it is “nothing that is temporally objective” (Husserl, 1969, p. 102).

In this manner the phenomenological reflection of time-consciousness *focuses* the entire structure of an intentional experience in which, before it is thematised, the consciousness *lived* in an unthinking (*silent*) form of forgetting the self. Husserl describes the life of consciousness – *regardless of its degrees of attention* – as a “look from the ‘now’ towards the new ‘now’”, (...) something *original* that for the first time prepares the way for future intentions of experience” (Husserl, 1980, p. 259). It is therefore the perceptive experience of the present, the presentation (*Gegenwärtigung*) that is the foundation of all time-consciousness. However, consciousness of the present is not a simple instantaneous consciousness of a punctual now of objective time. According to Husserl, an act of perception is a continuous process that is crossed by a bond of consciousness, by an act of apprehension that has unity; as a result, in a present phase the consciousness of the previous and successive phases is therefore already necessarily implied in this process (Husserl, 1969, pp. 232-234). The memory (recollection) and the expectation (future anticipation) that flow in to it, are acts of represen-

tation (*Vergegenwärtigung*) that enact the doubling of the present; they must not be confused with presentation (*Gegenwärtigung*) but must be distinguished from the continuous interweaving of non-independent retentional-protentional moments – since they are all necessarily bound together – of any intentional act that takes place in the present. What is being discussed is the importance of the structural alternation, along the uninterrupted axis of the absolute consciousness, of retention and protention, which establishes itself more and more from Bernau's research materials 1917-18 in the phenomenology of Husserlian time as a genetic phenomenology: the formation of a *continuum* of auto-differentiation that reveals itself as the actual condition of possibility for the *functioning* of time consciousness (cf. Husserl, 2001).

In longitudinal intentionality, absolute consciousness therefore never understands itself as an object, but in transversal intentionality it understands all objects. From the very moment that its two functions are said to be *inseparable*, absolute consciousness is original consciousness, in other words, consciousness of the origin of the difference between subject and object. However, paradoxically this consciousness never has full possession of itself. On the contrary, phenomenological reflection highlights the development of a passive genesis in which consciousness does not understand itself other than in there already having been a retentional modification. The presence of the consciousness that is identical to itself therefore forms against the background of absence. None of this contradicts the central role occupied by the original impression in absolute consciousness. Since it is constantly accompanied by retention, the original impression does not exhaust in the least the present of the consciousness in its revival of itself. If the time of this auto-giveness of the absolute consciousness can still be called *present*, then one must say that the *present* is the meeting or the difference between the present and the past. This original present (*Urgegenwart*) is therefore *in itself* a present-that-becomes-past (Bernet, 1994, pp. 234-235).

In the *functioning* of its triple temporal declination as *primary memory*, *original impression* and *primary expectation*, the original consciousness of time therefore proves to be a *continuum* of auto-difference that constitutes itself as this actual *difference* and, together, as its *internal condition of possibility* (cf. De Warren, 2009, p.175). This function of original time-consciousness defies definition and can only be described metaphorically as a flow since, according to Husserl:

It is something that we have given that name *on the basis of what is constituted*, but there is nothing temporally “objective” about it. It is *absolute subjectivity* and has the absolute characteristics of something that can be indicated, *with an image*, as the flow of something that originates at a point of actuality, at a point that is an original source, in a “now”, etc. In the experience of actuality, we have the original source point and a continuity of moments of resonance. And we have no names for any of these (Husserl, 1969, p. 75. Cf., similarly, the resonance of this *inobjectival* subjectivity in Husserl, 2001, pp. 277-278: “The I is not a being but the counterpart of anything being, not an object but the original position regards anything that is an object. The I should not actually call itself I, it should not call itself anything at all because otherwise it would have already become an object. I is the Without-name that is above anything one can grasp, not that exists, it hovers, it is above everything, on the contrary, it is what functions, grasping and evaluating, etc.”).

This function of consciousness as an *absolutely original phase* of the *living now* (*das Moment des lebendige Jetzt*) (Husserl, 1980, p. 150), is one of the most essential research themes of Husserl’s work on time-consciousness, “extended effort until the end of his work to name the living actuality, the *urtümliche stehend-strömende Vorgegenwart* of the absolute consciousness” (Bernet, 1994, p. 233; cf. Husserl, 2006, pp. 29-34).

Nevertheless, according to Husserl retentional consciousness is also of a finite nature and not just tendentially infinite: that of the progressive dissipation of retentions to achieve a *silent* horizon in which intuitive visibility and affective strength dissolve completely; this condition is, however, equally constitutive because it can give a past and presentification in the retentional consciousness, otherwise, “*nothing* would be past for me, and my life would be strangled in the amassing clutter of my living present as it expands without end. [...] What we experience never leaves us, but remains “dormant” within our past open to reactivation in acts of reawakening called remembrance or reflection” (De Warren, 2009, pp. 186-187; cf. Husserl, 2001, p. 67).

3.

With its problematic density and its *aporetic nature*, the absolute intimacy between consciousness and time that is highlighted by Husserl’s reflections

rightly belongs in the questioning of this dimension of profound persuasion, the unconscious faith in the becoming of time and its entrenchment in the *Essence of the Occident*, which Emanuele Severino studied with such skill in his works: the Nihilistic unconsciousness that objects are nothing, the unconscious persuasion that a *time* exists in which being and nothing coincide, a *time* in which the impossible is given: that the being exists and does not exist, that the self is different to the self, “that the *being*, as such, is separated from its *being*, and that therefore, to be, it must become; in other words it must proceed from not being to being [...] ultimately means, will not be able to join its own nothing once and for all after having being provisionally separated from it” (Severino, 2011, p. 216).

I believe that the aporetic overview of the phenomenology of Husserl’s time-consciousness, at least as regards its *two-dimensional* characteristic is, to a certain extent, very similar to Brouwer’s binary form of the temporality of intuitionism that Severino discussed; according to the latter, “it originates from the perception of a passage of time, from the separation of a moment of life into two distinct things, one of which makes way for the other, but is preserved by the memory” (Severino, 2019, pp. 361-362). According to Brouwer, if we remove every qualitative unit that belongs to this bi-unit (a sort of reduction), what remains is the empty form of their common substrate, and in this form the basic intention of mathematics is constituted:

It is the perception of a passing, of a temporal movement in which any moment of experience, or of “life” is divided into two things. That one of thing makes way for the other means that what divides itself is the thing that makes way for the other. By dividing itself, this thing is *something that becomes something else*. In this becoming something else, the initial something [...] becomes nothing: its being preserved in the memory actually means that its real existence has not been preserved, or rather, it has become nothing. However, together [...] the initial something becomes something else (Severino, 2019, p. 362).

The sense of these affirmations, the observation of their contradictory nature, rests on the fundamental *indication* that was never abandoned throughout Severino’s thoughts: that of the destiny of truth, in which *its original structure* is established once and for all: the place of the “appearance of the being self of the being, of all the beings that appear” and “the negation of which is auto-negation”. For Severino the original sense of need is *indisputably* founded in this *place*: the impossibility that any being

as such does not exist and therefore also the necessity of its eternity (cf. Severino, 2019, pp. 18-19). “Since each being must be eternal, *it is therefore necessary* that what appears to be a coming out of nothing and a returning (and that seems to be thus because it appears separate in its being from the eternity of each being) is instead the appearing and disappearing of the eternal” (Severino, 2019, p. 101).

The negation of being self of the being, auto-negation not only in as much as it negates the *being self* of the being *in actu signato* negating itself in *actu exercito*, but also in as much as it negates the *appearance* of the being self, since if it is not the appearance of being self, it would not even be able to negate it. Without this appearance the appearance of the being self would therefore not be able to constitute itself; because by negating it, it negates the very thing that it is impossible to exist without: and therefore “the auto-negation of the negation of the being self is, at the same time, the auto-negation of the negation of the appearance of the being self” (Severino, 2019, p. 70). The eternity of the being as a being means the eternity of each being and therefore also of the being that consists in contradiction, the negation of this eternity, that Nihilistic faith in time that basically characterises what Severino calls the appearance of the isolation of the earth from the Destiny of truth. It therefore appears as such, as a being, but appears together with the impossibility of its own content, which is a *nothing*, since it is the self-contradictory negation of the truth of Destiny.

In the language that Severino calls the testimony of the truth of Destiny, the meaning of becoming assumes a profoundly different meaning from the Nihilistic one of the beings entering and leaving from nothing. According to Severino, against the background of the eternal and ageless spectacle of the totality of beings, it is a matter of the always *infinitely* changing appearance and the disappearance of the beings that appear in what is called the finite circle of appearance. The finite circle of appearance is what embraces the appearance of each being that appears as a condition, auto-including itself in their appearance (in a *formally* similar way to the auto-expression of Husserl’s absolute time-consciousness). Like its part, this transcendental horizon belongs to the endless background of destiny, the *persintactic field*: the whole of these constants that appear wherever something appears, for example the eternity of the being as a being, and therefore of every being, and existence’s need for the infinite appearance of the totality of beings.

In accordance with the intentions of this language (where, as Severino frequently points out, interpretation must be distinguished from what is interpreted), an absolutely unprecedented sense of becoming appears:

How the “unexpected arrival” and “the beginning to appear” cannot mean, in the original structure of destiny, the beginning of being by the appearance of what starts to appear; thus, “no longer appearing” does not mean the loss, an end of the being by the appearance of what is no longer appearing. The disappearance of a being is therefore the start of another being’s appearance. When the voice of the wind disappears, it is followed by the appearance of a silence in which the things that remain have a different appearance. The unexpected arrival of this silence is the completion of the appearance of the voice of the wind (Severino, 2019, p. 85).

So therefore *every* being that achieves this appearance or disappearance has always necessarily implied *every* other being, is indebted to the necessary bond with the totality of beings for its appearance. “However, in the finite in which the original circle of destiny consists (as in every other circle), the totality (the infinite) of beings does not appear and it is impossible that they appear” (Severino, 2019, p. 81). This is what Severino calls contradiction C of the original structure of Destiny, according to which, “not demonstrating the necessary concreteness, what appears as the *totality* of the beings *is not the totality* of the beings (cf. Severino, 2019, p. 67). The appearance of destiny in the finite is a contradiction C; it is, however, no normal contradiction and is therefore not “a positive meaning of nothing” but the abstract mode in which the truth of beings appears: the necessary relation of each being that appears, with the infinite appearance of the totality of the beings.

According to Severino, there is no contradiction between the affirmation that the variation of the content that appears in the original structure is the appearance and disappearance of the eternal *that belong to the infinite appearance* of the totality of the beings and the affirmation that the eternal *that appear in the infinite*, and therefore also the eternal *that appear and disappear*, *differ* from self since they belong to the infinite appearance. Precisely because everything that appears in the finite is contradiction C, it is not only removed from the surpassing of its content, but from the surpassing of the finite form of its appearance, because its content, *as such*, is the same in the infinite and finite appearance, and this is why it reaching the finite is the beginning of the appearance in the eternal (Severino 2019, p. 103).

The language that bears witness to destiny therefore necessarily also belongs to the isolated land where, however, this testimony shows the

persyntactic dimension where this isolation is already eternally surpassed. The need for the concrete surpassing of the finite form of the eternal in which the dimension of erring, pain and death of the isolated land is the *promise* of the Destiny Severino formulates in *La Gloria* (cf. Severino, 2019, pp. 120-121; cf. Severino, 2001). *La Gloria* shows the need for every eternal that has arrived in the circles of destiny to be surpassed and that the original structure is therefore liberated infinitely (*infinitely* being impossible that the infinite in which every contradiction is eternally removed, appears in the finite) by the contradiction of the isolation of the land as well (cf. Severino, 2019, pp. 127-128). Severino's papers resolve the problems implied in this promise one after the other.

4.

The fundamental task of *Struttura Originaria* (cf. Severino, 1981²) was to indicate the need to find a way out of contradiction C. The *practical* proposal indicated in *Studi di Filosofia della Prassi* is unable to do so when it says that a certain faith could be what saves the original structure of the truth of contradiction (cf. Severino, 1984). The question remains basically the same in *Essenza del nichilismo* (in *Sentiero del giorno* and in *La terra e l'essenza dell'uomo*) (cf. Severino, 1982²). *Destino della necessità* "shows the need that the problem of the liberty of deciding and the contingency of events should be resolved negating their existence". However, the problem whether the Earth "is destined to solitude [to the isolation from destiny] or to the surpassing of solitude remains unsolved". *Gloria* solves these problems, showing "the need that the isolation of the Earth is surpassed and that the Earth that is saved from isolation proceeds along an infinite path where the infinite appearance of destiny reveals itself more and more concretely in the constellation of the circles of destiny". Chapter XI shows how the persyntax that appears in each circle is "the infinite syntax" that the finite appearance and the infinite appearance of destiny have in common (cf. Severino, 2001, pp. 439 and following pages; cf. Severino, 1980). What remains unsolved, however, is the problem that despite going beyond, the solitude of the Earth has to be extended, albeit for a finite period after the death of the empiric will. The problem that also remains unsolved in *Oltrepassare* is resolved by *La morte e la terra* (cf. Severino, 2007 and Severino 2019), where it is shown that "the instant" the death of the empiric will is immediately followed by is in turn immediately followed by

the decline of the isolation of the Earth, making a return to the solitude of the Earth impossible” (Severino, 2019, pp. 121-122).

As regards the Nihilistic meaning of Becoming, the faith in becoming different of the beings, is the continuous process of the *death* of what becomes different until real death, physical death in the sense of the extinction of any Becoming. “Something else becoming different is the death of what it was and no longer is. All it needs is a distant voice to “break the silence”, [...] but this breaking is its no longer being, in other words its death. And death is no metaphor, it should be understood literally: now that silence is nothing” (Severino, 2019, p. 165). And this brings us back to the crucial question of Husserlian’s phenomenology of time. Remerging through memory, the re-presentation of the present past in *time-consciousness*, which, as we have seen, is not simply the ghost of what has been. According to Husserl, it is therefore not a nothing, something that reappears in its no longer being, since the past preserves (it is believed), albeit in a *modified state*, together with the preservation (and retaining) of itself by the absolute consciousness of time. This Becoming, the repetition of the present in something else by means of the *retentional modification* of the memory, stops inevitably in the face of death, with the absolute alterity, the *absolute modification* of no long being able to become. In a note written in 1932, Husserl compares this transcendence to the enigmatic sense of death in the sense of an absolute alterity in which the reflection on time is completely dissolved; he talks of a “place for the possibility of death that cannot be represented in egological auto-observation, and which cannot have any kind of intuition that conforms with what was experienced” (Husserl, 1973, p. 452).

According to Severino, the enigma of the absolute silence of death that coincides with that of becoming, is enrooted in that of the faith that is called *transcendental bad faith*:

Uninterrupted silence [...] after a certain period of time is interrupted; and then more time goes by and now the silence of “before” “reappears”. It is the isolated earth that believes that “the silence before reappears”, and that is, that in the silence of before and in this new silence there is something identical that remains, despite the interruption that divided them. [...] When the new silence appears, the silence of before, if it appears, appears in the memory, in other words, it has become different; it no longer exists; it is dead. [...] One can doubt the “truth” of what one remembers. [...] In the destiny of truth the impossibility appears of remembering what,

since it no longer exists, is now nothing and the impossibility appears that there is a substrate which constitutes itself as what is identical between dead silence and nothing, and the new and living silence. This silencing of what nevertheless appears is “the transcendental bad faith” in which each faith consists (Severino, pp. 168-169).

This is therefore no conscious choice or decision but a fundamental condition in which doubt is closely linked to the certainty that characterises the earth that is isolated from the destiny of truth as the faith of becoming different. Transcendental bad faith is the faith that a substrate remains from which, in the form of memories, the fragments of the past can emerge of what no longer exists; but it is also the faith in which the original will of power appears, a will that is persuaded by being able to intervene in turn to *modify* this becoming different, a process that is inevitably destined to stop in the face of the total interruption caused by death: according to Severino, this is the same faith that I call my life (cf. Severino, 2019, p. 170):

In the isolated earth of each circle, in differently explicit and conscious forms faith in the existence in one's own life believes that one's own life is a becoming different in which continuing is interrupted in two primary senses: in the sense that after interruption memory does not restore the entirety of the past, but separate parts of it, and in the sense that death interrupts the way in which our life is a becoming different once and for all. [...] Death interrupts the permanence of life much more radically than other forms of interruption. The body no longer intervenes to transform the world and itself; and this means that the will, which is inseparable from the world, no longer wants the world, or rather, is no longer will (Severino, 2019, pp. 174-175).

In the language testifying Destiny, death on the other hand, takes on a radically different meaning: death is the appearance of the fulfilment of a will in the finite circle of the appearance of destiny, achieving the fulfilment of this will, the isolation of the earth in which it consists is also fulfilled (it is the *perfectum*, that appearing in full). However, this fulfilment does not mean the total decline of the isolation that necessarily requires that it decline in all the infinite circles of destiny. The death of the will that appears in a circle of destiny is however, the fulfilment of this will, which is the last stage of this appearance (cf. Severino, 2019, pp. 190-192). Since

it is a fulfilment, it *requires* “in the circle in which the will dies”, a being that is *different* from the being whose continuation in appearance is being fulfilled, a *different* being in which destiny is no longer opposed by the isolated earth (cf. Severino, 2019, p. 192).

At the very *moment* that will disappears and dies, and individual death takes place as a last will, the background of Destiny appears in its concrete, infinite totality; it appears, however as the last *reflection* of the background opposed by isolation and that is “appears [...] in its being *still* opposed by the isolated earth; it does not emerge beyond the opposed; it is still enclosed. For a moment” (Severino, (2013), p. 97). At this *moment*, in which the interpreting will is completed, the completion of language therefore also takes place: its *silence*. This is not just silence in the sense of a final silence in which every faith consists as the will to govern the becoming; it is a silence whose language is withdrawn *absolutely*, the silence evoked by the promise of the infinite appearance of the eternal performance: the silence of the splendour that has to follow *immediately after* this moment (cf. Severino, 2019, p. 198).

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