

# Mystic forebodings of destiny

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The world in which we believe we live – the world of pain and death – is the face that the earth comes to show in its being separated from the destiny of truth. In this errant horizon, the spectacles that gradually appear are its desolate individuations. Including all forms of wisdom, with which, trusting in death, the mortal seeks refuge from death. The wandering, however, is not a thought that is far removed from destiny, but is its distortion. In which that, in some way, leaks out. Given the correspondence between “isolated heart” and “pure earth”, it seemed interesting to us to identify isolated wisdom, in which, although, immersed in the folly of becoming nothing, the greater similarity to destiny resonates overall than all the others. In this paper we identify it with “Christianity”, in its multiform face: mystical, visionary, speculative, traditional – in any case *not* “demythologized” (= reduced to a minimum by the hidden blade of nihilism).

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**Misticism, Foreboding, Destiny, Glory, Eternity, Necessity**

## 1.

The isolation of the beings from the *Destiny of Truth* (which is the *Destiny of Eternity* is that which competes to *every* being for the sake of being) – the isolation of the “earth”: things and people, but also every great world event in history and therefore every form of culture such as science, art, religion, and philosophy – is founded upon the *non* isolated earth. «If a *non* isolated earth were not, the isolation would not isolate anything, thus not bringing about any isolation» (Severino, 2018, p. 318).

This implies that to every segment of the isolated earth *corresponds* a segment of the *non* isolated earth (currently veiled “beneath” to that which imposes itself, in contrast to its pure face), the one which it’s *most similar* to (see. *ivi*, chap. VII-VIII) – notwithstanding the abysmal difference: on the one hand the being is *believed* to be destined to desperation and to nothingness, whilst on the other the “same” being is destined to eternity and joy. «This means that such pure earth [= the *non* isolated earth from the destiny of truth] leaves its traces in the isolated earth and the former in the latter. In the isolated earth, traces of pure earth appear, but they are contrasted by the isolation» (p. 502).

We have said: the “same” being, which holds a double nature is taken by the vortex of the nightmare of nihilism on the one hand, and is free from this robbery which disrupts its pure face on the other. Indeed the horror of the nihilist *Folly* (the persuasion for which the being becomes nothing and that thus – by inevitable inference – *everything* becomes nothing and thus *is* nothing: Leopardi) is not only faith and a dream, «because to it corresponds what is most similar in the pure earth of the truth of destiny».

The whole content of the isolated earth is faith, not truth; but faith and the non-truth, as such, is not simple alterity and separation from truth: but because to it corresponds what in the pure earth is most similar to it» (p.541). «... folly [the belief that the becoming of the world consists of the

“evidence” of the becoming (identical) to another [=to another being and/or to nothingness] on the part of the becoming being and, once it has become it, to being it: *at once therefore being and not being itself* [...] is not to think all but to what is the content of *destiny*, but it is rather the disruption of the content of the *Destiny*, that disruption which, with a metaphor, we could see as the image that forms when a stick is put into water and is seen as broken. There is an alteration in the essential traits of destiny” (Severino, 2007 pp. 284-285). In the same way, the becoming as a start of the *apparition/disappearance* (the true immediate-phenomenological evidence) by the beings (the *eternal*: the immediate-logical evidence wherein *it is necessary to be itself or, elselly said, impossible to be other than itself*), immersed, so as to say, in the tide of the folly of nihilism, which appears as a beginning and a ceasing of existence, a *departure and a going back to the nothingness* of the beings.

## 2.

(What do we mean by “logical and phenomenological im-mediateness”? The former where there lies the necessity to assert immediately, as a necessary predicate of the being such as it is, therefore of *every* being, of *eternity*: if indeed the *immediate* level of the negation which is to be (every being: committed *parricide*, beyond Parmenides) is not to be, requiring a mediation to assert its eternity, would assume that such im-mediation, as a basis, did not exclude what it absolutely excludes, meaning that to be (every being) is not to be; the latter in the sense that the content that appears needs not a mediation so as to appear, in as much that its apparition is, in fact, “immediated”.

On the other hand though, one may wonder: *Why is it not possible to reject both assumptions?* That could be answered, because maybe we *should not do so*. And this is why: because we would be assuming its value, which is to be instead demonstrated. This is why *we cannot*. And why can we not? Because neither the negation of the principle of non contradiction (=the negation of the difference of the differences), nor the negation of the being which appears, *presume that same being which they refute*, thus ending in a self-negation. Such is the negation of the difference (between x and y, and x and non-x) which presumes that which it nullifies, as otherwise the negation cannot stand (and, as it stands, in its being as such, it is not being oth-

er but itself), so the negation of the being that appears, necessarily implies, in order to allow its negation, in its own configuration and that we are willing to deny, that in «such negation, this configuration will appear» (Severino, 2007, p. 250). In both cases, they deny their very foundations, (so themselves).

In this regard – made crystal-clear in the now endless Works of Severino – we will have to say, in his words, that «the original structure of destiny [the Shape of the destiny of truth] is the unity of the *élenchos* [=refutation] of the negation of the being itself and of the *élenchos* of the negation of the being that appears» (p. 249).

Thus the *concrete* logical-phenomenological im-mediation, has within itself its own mediation, in that *it is originally one with its own negation at the appearance of its self-negation*. Concrete Im-mediation: mediated im-mediation.

«The negation of the original structure, meaning the difference of the differentials [logical im-mediation] and of the existence of that which appears [phenomenological im-mediation], is the self-negation in that it refutes what without which it would be impossible» (Severino, 2019, p. 275).

### 3.

We were afore mentioning that to every segment of the earth, isolated by the destiny of truth – with the words of T.S. Eliot – to every segment of the *waste land*, (even though with a much more radical meaning than what he pictured) corresponds a dimension of the pure, non isolated earth, being that every aspect of it overturns and chokes the Pure Breath of the corresponding dimension, so that in the latter lies the necessity of the existence of the being that is *most similar* to that segment which is essentially lacking and full of pain.

«Destiny and the isolated earth sing, with the same notes, opposite songs, of truth and of wrong. In the song of wrong emerges therefore, but upside-down, the song of truth» (Severino, 2007, p. 374).

This is what is a priority for the great forms of culture which appeared on the earth (both Western and Oriental: even more for the latter, less aware, from an ontological point of view, and not yet free from that aura, yet fascinating and suggestive of the Myth), such as they are to conceive themselves as an Attempt to respond to pain (so to becoming nothing and

from nothing) tacitly assuming the non-transcendable aspect and thus *relying, unawares, upon death (nothingness) to win death (nothingness)* (See Severino, 2018).

Let's now turn to the great forms of knowledge of the isolated earth – to which each has a hidden correspondant in the pure earth. Those meant, underlying, as grand characters into making a *one great* formidable Knowledge yet in its multiple, differentiated development of *progressive coherence* when compared to its basic (alienated) “evidence” shared by all: the becoming as the becoming other/nothing; these in turn, just like their correspondant multiple, structured and unified by the *only* Knowledge, here worded by the philosopher Severino, in an attempt to testify it, in the light of which the veil of their death will appear from now on, triumphant with no exception, and will be recognised as such.

And we claim, it is clear, that all the isolated knowledge, in its assumption of universality (we may take, as an example, “Capitalism”, a genre mistakenly unrecognised as a branch of philosophy – needless to say “great”, as philosophy always is, otherwise it is not of philosophy we speak – and therefore a global vision of man and the world as a whole!), which disrupts the Destiny of Truth *from a certain perspective*, in which a certain part of Destiny (keep in mind the correspondence mentioned at various times) is given value to, in a radically altered form, keeping into account that the will of the totality that every knowledge assumes within itself, involves indirectly and correspondingly the whole of the Destiny. That is to say in every shape of the isolated knowledge (Illuminism, Idealism, Communism, Technoscience...) in which there are forms of the Destiny of the totality (the totality of the Pure Knowledge), even when throttled and hurled over by some sort of erring dimension.

From what has been speculated, we further consider: what knowledgeable disruption of Destiny is most similar to this? What disharmonic and dissonant “manifest harmony”, in the abysmal distance is the least distant from the pure “hidden harmony”? What dark light, which in the history of the world has been conjectured, uselessly shining light upon death, *priorly assuming that this, as it is, is true and real* (and so, out of the question, as *annihilation*), can, notwithstanding, more than any other, shine, in some way, a received reflected light by some secret Source, so that it may, although it may be blindly reaching out, powerfully foretell and tell? What mistaken truth, in its mortal sickness, has perceived by intuition, further than others, the Infiniteness of glorious infinities that lay spread out at the end of the Night? Or in what metaphysical folly has Joy – beyond the pow-

er of will, therefore beyond “man”, the mortal one, and beyond “God” himself – been awaiting since forever the advancing of the totality of the entity into the Path of Day, hidden itself in a less rigid form?

And of course, on the contrary: what erring of the mind expresses the zenith of Folly and so its maximum coherence and distance from Destiny? In what terrible knowledge is the extreme and incurable pain expressed, so as to reach the peak of the horror and so the maximum dissimilarity (however not without common ground: eternal in being although “being”!) with the Destiny and its Glory?

What does Destiny tell of? That *all* is eternal and because of this, Destiny has always been directed towards Glory. It is not about a “God”, who eventually “generously” can give to others than himself, an immortality which does not belong to his *naked* nature (the “creature” –, that, *sibi relicta* is not but a nothing). The maximum distance from Destiny, we must say then, is a whole nothing and bad. And not because of, we must stress this, an eventual suggestive good *boutade*, but, all in all, gratuitous and with no foundation. On the contrary, it is reinforced with a very rigorous inference, on the basis of the “evident” becoming nothing and that from nothing (on the part of the immediate manifested beings).

We could then affirm, that if Christianity is the chief way in which, in the isolated earth, the Destiny of Truth (even more, as for the intrinsic and inherent logic of Christianity, which is *infinitely* distant) is more present (less remote, less contrasted), then the philosophy of Leopardi embodies the opposite view (in which Nietzsche though, takes two steps forward: the joy of the superman for the absurd becoming, which, on the contrary, “the man” Leopardi, because of a contradictory principle residue, still suffers; and the concept of becoming – not in a fantastic dimension, but by rigorous inference – as an “eternal return of the equal”). Between the two extremities, we would like to say, «all the “middles” of which the western [now worldwide] culture and civilisation is composed of, are placed» (Severino, 1995, p. 309).

And so if the farthest opposition between Destiny and nihilism states: all is eternal and glorious/ all is nothing and painful; all that is within the nihilist thought, the maximum opposition is between Christianity (we are talking about the distorted knowledge, which is ever the more similar to Destiny) and the thinking of Leopardi/Nietzsche.

The first – within the scope of the first undisputed assumption (but taken as absolute undisputable truth) of becoming nothing and coming from nothing – all tended to meditate on how to retrieve the ruined orig-

inal unconscious (in truth irretrievable), attributing “eternal life” to all things, bodies and souls – imagined in all of their glory in their resurrection (which implies the *destruction*, and generally, we lose sight of it, of its previous configurations), which will compete to Nature as a whole. (Indeed «the new skies and the new lands» are quoted in unison by Isaiah (65, 17), St. Peter (II, 3, 13) and St. John (AP. 21, 1) implying the *destruction*, therefore of the sheer irretrievability of the correspondent “older versions”).

(In that grand affresco of Christianity which is *The city of God* (Bompiani, Milano 2015), St. Augustine, quoting a passage of the Gospel (pp. 1152-3) (“But not a hair of your head will perish”: *Luke* 21, 18), insists with particular strength on the liberation, not from the body, but of thy body (a scandal to the Greeks, who turned down and judged absurd the speech of St. Paul in the Areopagus of Athens on the resurrection of the dead: *At* 32-3). Also for St. Augustine, educated by Greece (Plotinus, Plato), there was no doubt on the becoming as an «annihilation of life» (*ivi*, p.613), but evermore «if we want to be Christians – he writes –, we must believe that there will be the resurrection of the dead in the flesh too» (*ivi*, p. 1032). He believes so to the point of stating that “up above”, to our resurrected bodies, «will be removed not the possibility, but the necessity of eating and drinking; they then will be spiritual beings, not because they will stop being bodies, but because they will live thanks to the spirit that will give them lives” (*ivi*, p. 631); subjugated by the spirit, the body will not need any aid: «it will certainly not be the body of an animal, but a spiritual one, yet having the substance of flesh, but without its carnal corruption” (*ivi*, p. 1176). So: a flesh-not flesh (a square circle): the great difficulty of St. Augustine in trying to transform an authentic non-sense into a “mystery” is understandable (and as such, not acceptable by reason). It is known that the theme of the resurrection of the dead presents formidable anticipations in the Old Testament: see Isaiah first («he will swallow up death forever... Your dead will live, Lord; their bodies will rise, those who dwell in the dust will wake up and shout for joy»: 25, 8 e 26, 19) and Daniel: «Multitudes who sleep in the dust of the earth will awake...»: 12, 2).

#### 4.

«I believe that today’s sufferings – writes St. Paul – are worth nothing when compared to the glory that will appear to us. The spasmodic waiting of

things created, is indeed, in those expectations of the manifestation of God's sons and daughters. That which was created was, in fact, experienced as transient [=to become nothing: the "evidence" that St. Paul himself does not dream to discuss] not by thy own will, but by him [Adam] who made it so [we will consider that transience is not primarily rooted in Adam, such as St. Paul here suggests, but by a God who is deeply immersed in the conviction to have drawn these beings out from their nothingness; whose potential "eternal life", as a consequence, does not belong to them *by nature*, but *by grace*, thus corroborating their essential and unsurpassed nature of transience], all this in the hope that creation itself will be freed from the subjugation of corruption [remaining though "creation" and so reaffirming the folly and servitude intrinsically implied in the act of creation where nothing becomes (identical to) being] in order to reach the freedom of the glory as sons and daughters of God. From the beginning to now the entire creation, as we know it, has been groaning in one act of giving birth» (Rom. 8, 18-22). A greatly perspicuous passage (although there are very many – splendid ones – in the letters of the Apostle) regarding the desperate intensity with which we try (in vain) to attribute to all things without exception what (eternity) – in opposition to Destiny – has been taken away beforehand. So that, (conceived as) *separate* from the very beginning from its own being, the "thing" – firstly man – will eventually be able to become one forever only in view of a miracle (grace), confirming in this way, to being, unto thyself, nothing. But the effort – the great intuition *if we think of the Destiny of Truth*, that otherwise would be nothing but myth and rhetoric (of which the twentieth century man is in no need) – to envisage as "divine", what is assumed as nothing, is nonetheless unique: «You are all gods – you may read in the Psalms (82,6) – you are all sons of the Most High! But like mortals you will die»; and Jesus reasserts this same message in the Gospel of St. John (10, 34): «Jesus answered them: "Is it not written in your Law: *I have said: you are gods?*"»; and this is what St. Paul reinstated, to some extent, in his speech at the Areopagus of Athens: «For in him we live and move and have our being... We are his offspring. Therefore since we are God's offspring...» (At 17, 28-29).

Other is the *mystery*; other, a completely different one (going back to notation 1), the *absurd* – in which, repelling it from reason because *impossible*, we cannot believe it (the first to admit such assumption was St. Thomas). But (it is the leitmotif of this work) *the absurd in question* – *taken the stick from the water in which it appears to be broken* – *reveals itself as the truth*: even the flesh, like the "spirit" *and every one of the not-nothings*,



are eternal, not before annihilating themselves in their flesh-in flesh, then resurrecting as a spiritual flesh (and then again, thus, the contradiction); *but as such!* And in that the absurd *for those who believe in the absurd* that in the becoming the being is at stake!

For those same who then, through and in spite of the grave filter of the contradiction and of the folly, *perceive, feel, fortell, guess, make out from a haze* what is not for them possible to assert (is in fact, that *everything*, the physical property of nature and also the individual human flesh, is destined to eternity – *one way or another*).

## 5.

On the other side, Leopardi and Nietzsche.

On the one hand, the great Italian Poet and Philosopher Leopardi who anticipates of 60 years Nietzsche's proclamation of "the death of God" and is thus anticipating the more radical left-winged followers of Hegel and the very Existentialism. On the basis of the evidence of the becoming of the world, in fact, Leopardi infers that «nothing exists prior to things. Neither forms, nor ideas, or necessity or even reason of being, one way or another. *All comes after existence*» (Leopardi, 1988, P 1616); if indeed the «pure real fact [=the evident becoming]» (P 1342), were anticipated in any way, whereas "something" (privileged, independent, eternal) existed «afore things» (*Ibid.*), as absolute Essence of these, then these would be reduced to appearance and dream. Whereas instead, were the opposite to be: the terrible concreteness of the world and the pain that belongs to it, such as becoming nothing and coming from nothing which has the power to undermine anything that makes it illusionary and thus reduces it to a mere «arbitrary novel of your fancy» (P 1615), is what Nietzsche unveils by its origin and will then define it as the "Real World". The root of any kind of Platonism is the same as Christianity itself. But indeed: «if all pre-existing platonic forms of things were destroyed, you would have destroyed God» (P 1342).

«Oh infinite vanity of truth!» (P 69), sighs Leopardi.

We can observe that the truth, as in such cannot be vain, ("arid" and "cold", just as he declared). And if we really were confronted with something lifeless, then it could not be the truth! This is a contradiction that disturbed Leopardi's thinking, in which it is still "man" who talks, and not yet the "superman" of Nietzsche, who is *joyful* of what terrifies and shocks

man, triumphing in the nonsensical Dionysian eternity – which means of *its own!* Until it conceives the becoming *by deduction*, on the basis of its very own evidence, as its *eternal return of the equal* (see Severino, 1999).

Here are, in a nutshell the knowledgeable opposite ends, in which the “medium views” – although of high value, we may turn to Hegel for instance – as viewed in this context, somewhat lose strength.

## 6.

Which leaves us with a great question open.

We are speaking about “Christianism”. But let us linger on this point. “Christian” were people such as St. Paul, Arius, the Cathars, the extraordinary woman by the name Margherita Porete, it also was the heresy of the Free Spirit (just to name one), the Orthodox church (which negates the *filioque*), and St. Thomas and Eckhart, both Dominican Fathers, to point to Modern figures, and not mentioning many others, like Pascal, Kierkegaard, Dostoevskij, Simone Weil up to the great philosopher Giovanni Gentile – whose whole work was prohibited by the Roman Church –, even though the author would call himself a Christian, a Catholic in fact (see Gentile, 1992). The list goes on with G. Bontadini, a Neo-Thomist of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, reaching the most relevant mystic Italian scholar (Eckhart as a representative), M. Vannini, an objectively sided Christian, let us say, with an actualistic and spiritualistic approach, but who, surprisingly, does not seem to know the philosopher Gentile at all.

Here we are faced with a problem: which one of these “Christian beliefs” is “the most similar”, in the abysmal distance, to the Destiny of Truth, as an incontrovertible statement, (= as an integration, in origin, of the self-negation of its own negation) of the eternity of everything?

We answer: the least that has been touched by the nihilist coherence that, nevertheless, by necessity, it holds within, and is, as a consequence, more “visionary”, although it will thus entail, notwithstanding (so in a contradictory fashion), the commitment to assign eternity to every thing as much as it may muster. We have also seen this to be true for the individual bodies (as they are “resurrected”). (As for the disgraced Spinoza – the *res extensa* – is not only eternal, but divine and as such, it is certainly not specific to this or that individual, sensitive body).

But where, for instance, in Gentile’s work (as in Vannini’s; even though the former is more committed to giving an “actualistic” view to his as-

sumptions, the latter tends to take position on matters without a concrete basis<sup>1</sup>), the “evidence” of the becoming *becoming* (of the *thinking* thought: the act in acting) certainly yields mere *illusions* («parts where fancy wanders freely»: Gentile, 1994, p. 145), the substantial independence of the soul from the body, personal immortality and faith in another world (ivi, XIII, 4). Without even mentioning the resurrection of the body, of which the “Christian” Vannini did not hesitate in attributing to the fancy of St. Paul, who, in his stead, would reduce it to a mere extrinsic credo and contrary to the evangelical belief (an authentic *dys-anghélion*), subordinate to the miracle (=abhorrent adoration of power) the real Christian faith, as interior experience of exceeding oneself and the never-ending *detachment* from thyself (Eckhart): the true Christian resurrection, not reduced to myth, of one who makes himself one with the divine spirit ceaselessly denying himself (=mystical death). So, Gentile: «Becoming Immortal, not remaining attached to one’s shell like an oyster to its rock» (1994, p.157).

And it is, furthermore, significant, that, in spite of their differences, both Gentile and Vannini (but not only), consider their work that of a *radical demythicization* of Christianity as the access to the real God! In this way, they lose what pushes to the so-called “demythicization”, which is that force with which the becoming of the world is imposed (both philosophers call it the “spirit”), which has a demanding nature and as so requires to have *nothing* around it. Thus, it requires not to be enscribed – as otherwise the essence of tradition requests to be – in an ontological heterogeneous eternal (so “divine”), that will fatally cancel its “evidence”, relinquishing it, ultimately (and so from its very origin) to impossibility. There where the precipice in which, with no return and *completely beyond their intentions*, both fall, is the path to a “God” (to an “Absolute”), *but it is Dionisus* – the last “God” who really and truly is, with no reservations, coherent to the basic nihilistic assumption: the Becoming itself (the Case).

1. That is, first of all, considering metaphysical theology to be an absolute “false science” and, actually, “chatting” (this a recurring judgment, generally, in his works: 2007, 2011, 2018, 2019), a mere correlative of psychology (the latter also interpreted, for many good reasons by the way, as a wrong form to merely reduce of man to the psychic dimension). In this way, he has exempted to tackle, denying, the high *lógoi* that are the foundations of the great aristotelic argument and then the neo-aristotelic medioeval and further on the neo-aristotelic-thomistic in the twentieth century (G. Bontadini above all): the *lógoi* (and they do exist, if for anything they should be proven false) of the ontological dualism (which has been admitted, even by Vannini, if we stand by the absolute declared onto-metaphysical *heterogeneity* between God, the eternal and the fleeting creatures).

Instead we wish to stop at the Christian *threshold* of this abyss (in truth already part of the precipice itself), considering it in its “mythological naivety”. This is surely felt, from a Greek standpoint, as a becoming something else, like coming out and going into nothing (although, in this sense, we are already alien to the myth), in addition to being turned to the eternal (as was rigorously considered by Parmenides: extratemporal) – here, of course, there is no naivety; we are dealing, nonetheless, than with the grandiose ontological framework woven firstly by the Greeks (we will add the concept of “free will” to that, which was elaborated in particular by Aristotle in the *Etica Nicomachea*, IV, 4) –, but, therefore, in this matter there is no intention of abandoning (like *de jure* would say – and will say!), to the substantial and immortal nature of the soul, to its individual multiplicity, to the existence of the beyond and to the resurrection of the body. And it is to this “simple” and “utopistic” Christianity that we want to refer to especially (although, it is certain, forebodings of the Destiny of Truth are traceable in *every* knowledgeable form. We can consider Heraclitus (fr.27), as resounding in words so little considered all in all: «Men, when they die, are awaited by things that they do not hope or consider» – just as his traces are present in everything).

Let’s outline the meaning of this “simplicity” (as it cannot be done regardless of any dominant metaphysical presumption – so was for St. Augustine and before him for St. Paul).

It is not indeed a kind of Christianity that is devoid of *lògoi*; and yet it tends to understand, according to a lesson of Pascal, that it is a tool to unveil the fallacy of the same *lògos*, instead of being a way to demonstrate definitive metaphysical truths. «Nothing is conform to reason as is this repudiation of reason» (Pascal, 1973, n. 140). It would be like saying that true philosophy (the most absolutely attainable one by human reason) consists of bringing the limits of philosophy itself to light (and in this way the relativity of human reason): «The supreme step of reason stands in recognizing that there are an infinite number of things that go beyond its capability» (n. 139); this would mean that «to mock philosophy, means to truly do philosophy» (n. 4).

(We would like to underline that Pascal – and that all the other philosophers who preceded him and will succeed him – surely took for granted a number of great metaphysical truths that we cited above and that he was given directly from the Greek philosophers: firstly the “evidence” of becoming nothing; such as is shown by E. Severino, which is surely not a

piece of *evidence*, being indeed a *doctrine* (which has the same root of Folly) and so would rather be a meta-physics: «All things came out from nothing», would write Pascal: *ivi*, n. 158).

Thus said he gave room to the “feeling”: *I feel*, said Pascal (we can think back to Rousseau and, *mutatis mutandis*, to Dostoevskij). And, as it is renowned of Pascal, it is the “heart” that feels, not reason; «The heart, not reason, feels God» (*ivi*, n. 148). By now, following through with the elements of our argument at hand, is it not crystal-clear that the famous synthesis of “misery and greatness” with which Pascal identifies human nature (after the original sin) expresses, in its own way (alienated and at the same time foretelling) the concept of Severino that is the “disruption of the truth of Destiny” (after that “sin”, the authentic original “sin”, is consisting in the event of nihilism)? A “misery” then, although confined and founded on “greatness”, which inevitably seeps through, and so to which humankind is destined: the misery of a dethroned king (*ivi*, n. 215)! (*Formally* – and we only mean formally – Severino could not but agree).

And could that be what the secret “simplicity” – of the *facilitas* – that Cusano was meaning to explain to his Brothers regarding the “mystical theology”, when he dedicated the text *De visione Dei* to them? (Cusano, 2013, p. 65). Meaning, as much as one can ponder upon it, a very deep, thoughtful, inescapable (“simple” and “easy”) *feeling* that “God” extends infinitely beyond what, in a faulty manner, we demonstrate. A sort of “science of love” – as termed by St. John of the Cross –, as an *obscure night* not only to the senses but also to reason, in which «the extreme inferiority of human stance in face of the supreme knowledge and to the divine feeling appears. It also shows [to the thirsty soul] how limited and improper, for how eloquent and wise all the terms and words with which, on earth one talks about celestial things, and how it is impossible to know them with natural tools *without the enlightenment of the mystical theology* [our italics]. And as, in light of the knowledge, it [the soul] finds truths that cannot be reached by human and earthly paths, he calls this contemplation, and does so correctly [ours and not ours anymore, as St. Paul would phrase it] “secret”» (John of the Cross, 2009, pp. 117-118).

Well, of course! We think of the various “demonstrations” of the existence of God, of the foundations of the “principle of non-contradiction” – firstly of Parmenides and after of the “parricide” of Plato, of Aristotle and all those that followed –, which was born with a nihilistic malady and therefore, at first, expressive of the rhythm of becoming, understood as the

sphere in which the entity is, *when* it is and *when* it is not, is not<sup>2</sup> (nothing could be clearer – or more of a mistake, at the same time, as implying, implicitly, the identity of the absolute opposites). Interpreted in this way, it is inevitable that such a principle as a most renowned *principium firmissimum*, holding the viper in its bosom, only apparently can represent the foundation to demonstrate the Unbecomable divine (here, we say, the secret reason of the feeling of lacking and frustration of which Pascal accuses the “demonstrations” regarding the metaphysical and theological field: the dialectics on faith of Pascal – I know, I do not know, I believe – and that would greatly be caught up with by Kant in his two *Critiques*), inevitably ending up overwhelming what the servant cannot be – but becoming its Master (maybe the being, in the becoming, is when is not and is not when it is? Certainly not, ergo. *Ergo the opposition of the opposites, that we explicitly intend to keep firmly set, is the mask of absolute plausibility that the mask of Folly can implicitly wear dethroning unrestrained*). But just: “us” – “capable of” (=open to) God, *we feel* that something very different (that same infinity) is opening its doors, something way beyond this “world” (and that disappointing demonstrated “God”)! That which the “*mystical theology*” of any time has always *easily* and *simply* foretold, foreshadowed, guessed. St. Augustine would say that we would not *feel* it if He had not marked us with a torment of a heartbreak that no spectacle of the world (and no theological theory), would ever appease (*inquietum est cor meum, Domine...*). So, in the image is concealed and burns That which of the image is imaged.

(The “heart” of Pascal (=Deus in nobis= faculty of the infinite, superior to reason= love flame of God), is embodied as the Christian-fideistic transcription of the soul, full of truth in a platonic-socratic maieutics philosophical dimension: this dimension, setting of an endogenic force (=“infinity” within us is what deep inside us we are *by nature*); the esogenic one (=“infinity” within is the presence of a “guest” that belongs to us *by grace*). In any case and in both cases, those who were to feel the “ardour” less (the *mysterious* call, to philosophy or to faith in Christ: “mysterious” because being touched or not by it, presents itself as a pure “event”), not so would not have within such treasure, that would then result in (enigmatically enough) less ripe or, which would be the same, would feel it less strongly;

2. On the “principle of non-contradiction” (in between quotation marks!) as «fundamental rule that Nihilism [dressed as metaphysics] gives to itself», see E. Severino, 2015, pp. 329 and 343.

so, this individual would be inevitably, but indirectly, directed towards it, through dimensions of less value, making of it and necessarily an “absolute” (assumption of the finite as infinite): money, honour and pleasure...).

Is this the mystical theological “simplicity” and that of its “object”? The enlightenment (enigmatic: *spiritus flat ubi vult, gratia quia gratis datur*) with which, *suddenly*<sup>3</sup>, “we feel” (not at a psychological level, note: we are here dealing with the highest level of *lògos*, not of speech – and we may here think to how harshly Schelling was criticised by Hegel) the idea of infinity (of “God”) that we have within, *unitely* to our need of *detachment* from anything that is finite (with this thorn in the soul, the platonic prisoner climbs up the steep hill of the cavern of thyself and of things)? To the various views – every hour and not ever – of the infinite Object: of One. But it is not about “vision”, lectures Plotinus, but about «an ecstasy, a simplification (ἔκστασις και ἁπλῶσις)» (*Enneadi*, VI, 9, 11).

And from the start again: what enigma hides in this “simplicity”? How are we to interpret it? As the exercise (a virtuous one) of the *detachment* is far from the rhetoric of not-knowing anything/not-wanting anything: who practices it assumes to know (in truth, it is nothing but a grand faith) nonetheless the ontological picture designed by the Greeks (as we afore mentioned), included the “free will”; and it is not true that he wants nothing – *in this sense, it cannot be not asked to God* –; on the contrary (Nietzsche knew it rather well), it is through this very act, *that he believes he can want and obtain anything!* His very eternal happiness! Even if not like this person or that other, but yet it is to “thyself” he is thinking of: a will of salvation that is also a will of power (and viceversa).

(Vannini wrote a comment in this regard: «The sacrifice [the detachment] is a sacrifice of the small, egotistical self: he who sacrifices sacrifices himself» (2019, p.72). Thus expressed, meaning without specifying the

3. «Suddenly, just as light sparking at the setting off of a spark», the knowledge of truth (that does not lie in language), «is born in the soul and takes its nourishment from it» (Plato, *Letter VII*, 341 d); «... suddenly to him [= who has been educated philosophically in love matters], a beauty, marvellous by nature will be revealed... an eternal beauty, that is not born and does not die...» (Plato, *Symposium*, 210 e); «...at this point [of the ascent to the One] the individual gets rid of every teaching and... suddenly he sees; and he does not see “how”, but the vision fills his eyes with light...» (Plotinus, *Enneadi*, VI, 36, 19). In Christian domain, it is the sudden lightning, that is spoken of in St. Augustine (*De Trinitate*, VIII, 3) and Margherita Porete (*The mirror of the simple souls*, chapp. 58 e 132) and that took inspiration from St. Paul's folgoration (At 9, 3).



different *sub eodem*, the assertion appears contradictory. Indeed the “one who detaches himself” cannot in fact be, *simpliciter*, the same “detached one”. But in this contradiction there lies a precious lapsus: *in the horizon of the faith* (of belief) – and not of *epistème* and incontrovertibility (=the same essence of philosophy – that Vannini, on the other hand, never takes into account) –, so is only of will, which is to say groundlessness, arbitrary, dogmatism... *and it is the very little “I” to be the protagonist* (not the *lògos* in him: reduced to a content of faith, the “*lògos*” it is such only in words). The “other” – the so-called real self, the big I – is a *believed/wanted* by it unto which he hopes, committing suicide in the detachment, to achieve salvation/power. So this very individual (as a “believer”, the “new man” says St. Paul) operates “virtuously” for the destruction of its very own evidence (its not believer immediate nature: the “old man”), for something merely hoped for. *He accepts to put to death his precarious evident existence for a not precarious not evident existence.* Fideistic astoric individualism: the exact opposite of the “spiritualism” according to Hegel (opposite to what Vannini’s thought was). E. Severino stated in (2017, p. 227): «Even when a mystic man [in a most radical time of abandonment] opens his arms wide to let the divine in, he believes that this absolute passiveness of his, compared to divine power, is the most efficient way to take part in this power, compared to which, all worldly ones grow pale»).

This, in a nutshell, for what is to be said on the subject. What about the “object”? Must we think about the One (God, Infinity), of the mystical theology in compliance to Plotinus and, *mutatis mutandis*, to Buddhism? Just as the absolute indetermination of Brahman (and its correlative *nirvana* as “extinction” of every *principium individuationis*)? M. Vannini had interpreted it this way, bringing the same Eckhart to this side (and, of course, to see it from this standpoint, we can find hints in the texts of the great Dominican; although there are even *others* and opposites too) – and also Hegel!

Despite this, we must highlight that the plotinian One does not coincide at all with the extremely indeterminate being of Parmenides, in that it is not constituted of an “empty” unity but of a “whole”: «The One is all things» (*Enneadi*, V, 1,1), Plotinus writes (Parmenides would certainly not have agreed!). In this way, as an inevitable consequence, beyond the intentions of Plotinus, the One *can not hold within the trace of the multiple*. In fact, to say that the many pre-exist *simpliciter* as “one”, would be like saying that they do *not pre-exist at all*. As a consequence: 1. Of the One, we could not say at all, as, on the contrary, Plotinus does say, stating “it is all



things”; 2. It would be necessary to recognize that the multiplicity of things are produced, not from One, *but from nothingness*. To this follows, as a claim, that the One is *all but a pure simplicity* (and not even, to see it in a just light – but we will leave this matter for the moment – a pure act, being potential at least as a “world”).

## 7.

In his very rigorous radicalism (within the scope of nihilism), Gentile finishes with the assumption that all becomes nothing except the eternal process to become it (meant as the transcendental I). In his own way, as mentioned, Vannini has his own train of thought. So both baptize “God” – the Christian God! – and this tiny, super-energetic shred of reality (*ego te baptizo piscem*, just like Mazzarino baptized the meat during Lent making Louis XIV’s mouth water). Vannini thus finds himself very close to radical Atheism and radically consequential of Nietzsche, who thus tries, but absolutely absurdly, to Christianize his contents (conceiving «the *Übermensch* as a man renewed by grace [yes, I heresay: but by Dionysius!]» (Vannini, 2019.p.38), but omitting completely the decisive and corresponding concepts of “will of power” and “eternal return to equal”; the latter, as we know, judged by Nietzsche, as (his) very most profound thought!).

In line, instead, with the intentions that underlie the present text, we interpret the “One” (and its “simplicity”) not as a God-killer who creates to annihilate (living on others’ deaths) – “It seems [=appears] that the being of things has, as its one and only objective, death. Not being able to die, that what was not, so, from nothing came the things that are not» (Leopardi, 1982, p. 287) –; not therefore, that icy and mortal “simplification”, that, like an axe would fall on an infinity of things annihilating them all and that Hegel, mystical in his own way (but the *system of categories* – the Idea – Vannini does as though they never existed!), celebrating the divinity of the Concept, defines as «an immense abbreviation faced with the singularity of things» (Hegel, 2016, p. 18). Simplification, abbreviation: slaughter! Would we prefer to call it “love” and “peace”?

(“Love for the creatures”: an authentic terminological contradiction that goes completely undetected at customs of the bad reason (=the “principle of no contradiction” – between speech marks) but, certainly, as an innocent and good thing! Where you consider a being a “creature”, it means to priorly assume it to being *a nothing* and so *to treat a not-nothing*

as a nothing. Eckhart – 2014, p. 697 – often repeats this axiom of *the most pure violence possible*: «All creatures are a pure nothing... they are made of nothing, are and were nothing». And A. Silesius, a great versifier of his, would not stop re-stating it (2018, II, 21): «The world is an empty nothing»).

## 8.

On the other hand we think that the true “One”, to whom all Christian mystical (theology) unconsciously aspires to, is that “One” that is the *sui generis* witnessed by E. Severino’s philosophy and whom, notwithstanding all, appears to us as the “most similar” knowledge. The “One” interpreted as the infinity of the infinite eternities that includes from the start, this painful and desolated earth of ours, that from the very beginning has also always been stretched out to infinity and beyond it, to the Glory and Joy of Everything. In which, as we may say, will find complete satisfaction *the errant and at the same time the foretold intuition* about “substantiality” of the “soul”, the “salvation” of the many (the actually infinite: see Severino, 2001, V) ”souls”, the existence of the “otherworld”, the “resurrection” of the bodies, and the very “transcendent existence of God”; and, in particular, *to really be on the other side of the operating* – which is the *Folly of making something become something else* (=will of power = to make be what was not and not be what was) – on God’s behalf (and on divine “man’s” behalf: the authentic *overman*, who does not wish to gain anything with money, not even his “salvation”, *because he does not want simpliciter any longer*). *Divinidad*, it is prophetically named by S. Juan de la Cruz; *Gottheit*, the “diviner” Eckhart: the *True Detachment* from the *Regio dissimilitudinis infinitae* – the world of the faith of the becoming nothing –, perceived as something “bad”, but at the same time confirmed because considered “evident” by Plato, Plotinus and St. Augustine (*Politico* 273 d; *Enneadi*, I, 8, 13; *Confessioni*, VII, 10). (Just as it will be for Leopardi!, who however will deal – this is the epochal difference – with the terrible and strict consequences).

(«I pray God to free me from God»: so Eckhart (1985, p. 136), with an unparalleled synthetic power, alludes to a superior “God”, infinitely beyond that “God” that is such *for the creatures*, even in his Trinity form. We wonder: what does he *foresee* from afar, when, through his formidable and out-of-time philosophy (*the mystic is the speculative*, Hegel, his admirer,

will then say), breaks through the veil of the prevailing orthodoxy, looking on the one hand *beyond “God” and beyond the “man”*? On one hand, putting the *Gottheit*, concretely infinite and inutterable, up against *Gott*, a convenient simulacrum and golden calf of the lazy souls; and thus the indiscernable Abyss of the transcendent Divinity to the mediocre and instrumental representation that “man” uses, his relative mirror («God and the Divinity are separated so far apart such as the sky is from earth»: *ivi*, pp. 78-9; «God operates, the Divinity does not operate... God and the Divinity are separated by the acting and the not acting»: *ivi*, p. 80). On the other hand, comparing “man”, firstly and essentially meant as *Grund der Seele* (“bottom of the soul”) and so *divine* as equal as God, to “man” as a mortal self, in flesh and soul. So it is then true that it is not understood how the Trinitarian God (*Gott*) – and as a logic consequence, the man and the world – *are generated* by Divinity (*Gottheit*), in the same way as the Spirit compared to the plotinian One *which produces it*, seen the complete inactivity of the first).

Then, “God” – if we still wish to use this term (unreal and largely prejudiced from a nihilistic perspective) –, meant as the eternal and infinite All. Whose inexpressible “transcendent” complexity (an infinity of infinities), is no other than its eternal explication (but this term is not to be read in a productive-poietic way) of its *super-simple* Root: “A=A” (the appearance-of-being-thyself).

(To “be thyself” implies, indeed, the conscience, the reflection (the “apparition”); only for which “A” is worth “A=A”. Supposing “A” as isolated, as simple “noema”, by the reflection for which it is put equal to itself – “A=A” – and thus as “dianoema”, so “A” would appear (*in the realistic theory* that affirmed it as independent from the apparition/thought); but, appearing as “A” isolated, it could not exclude its not being not-A and so *it would be and would not be itself*. But this is impossible, ergo. (See E. Severino, 1995, p. 106). We can deduce that «the being as such being appears» (E. Severino, 2007, p. 546) or, said otherwise, that *the apparition belongs to the essence of the being as such*).

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