

# The Primal Structure of *Agàpe*

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The Primal Structure posits the primal truth-justice nexus, but does not thematize it: for Severino the truth of being is supreme justice, because, if that were not the case, the Primal Structure would only be source of cognition and not of injunction. Severino, in fact, makes injunction and cognition, moral necessity and logical necessity, coincide. My hypothesis is that the works that followed *La Struttura Originaria* contain the necessary development of the Primal Structure and show how ontological difference, qua ontological difference, can be an ontological difference only provided it is also theological. Severino postulates but does not explain this movement, because theological difference necessitates an ethical connotation. Deontology of the foundation must return to ontology of the foundation. I will try to show how imagination is primal compared to concept, which ultimately uses imagination to secure itself to the existential.

**Keywords:**

**Primal Structure, *Agàpe*, Imagination, Justice of affection, Emanuele Severino, Pierangelo Sequeri**

The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.

Ludwig Wittgenstein

## The relation between finite and infinite

It all starts when something appears. For French philosopher Marc Richir the articulation of reality occurs via *Wesen sauvages*, wild essences that appear in language, that are perceptible in language – when there is language –, but that have nothing to do with language. Whenever something that cannot be reduced to language and that does not belong to language itself enters our language, when we experience meaning beyond language, that is when we acknowledge the authentic phenomenality of what precedes cognitive datum within what Richir terms *phanthasia*.

The *Wesen*, that part of reality that resists meaning, like Jacques Lacan's *objet petit 'a'* are logical figures that have no image and that are not even concepts but which establish a nexus between cognitive, affective and practical moments. The world of *Wesen* is that world of affections that presents its evidence and phenomenological effectivity in the cognizance of what a phenomenon cannot saturate: phenomenomenity – language included – activates *Wesen* but they nonetheless remain within a realm of non-saturatable meaning, therefore outlining imagination as the origin from where all the conceptual-logical or empirical reductions derive. Milanese theologian Pierangelo Sequeri formulated the following example to illustrate what it is that language reduces to an empirical phenomenon and to show what it is that sensitivity can grasp of the residue of that reduction: given the same pressure, superficial electricity, and humidity conditions, our sensitivity infallibly perceives the difference between a reassuring mother, a doctor in his attempt to formulate a diagnosis, a friend acting supportively, and a reproaching father.

A theoretically similar process has been also formulated by Alain Badiou in his interpretation of the count-as-one notion, as an operation based on an inconsistent multiplicity, whose synthesis leads to a coherent multiplicity. Ontology therefore becomes a presentation of the un-shaped, of the a-thematic. Even for Badiou the mathematical operation has a residue, a residue he calls “void” that consists of the unrepresentable part of a presentation.

There is no one, only the count-as-one. The one, being an operation, is never a presentation. It should be taken quite seriously that the ‘one’ is a number. And yet, except if we pythagorize, there is no cause to posit that being qua being is number. Does this mean that being is not multiple either? Strictly speaking, yes, because being is only multiple inasmuch as it occurs in presentation. In sum: the multiple is the regime of presentation; the one, in respect to presentation is an operational result; being is what presents (itself). On this basis, being is neither one (because only presentation itself is pertinent to the count-as-one), nor multiple (because the multiple is *solely* the regime of presentation). [...] It seems rather that ‘being’ is included in what any presentation presents. One cannot see how it could be presented *qua being* (Badiou, 2006, pp. 24-25).

There is something beyond language, there is something that precedes thematization, and then there is a first level, where what is at play is the deontology of the foundation, which is tied to linguistic form. Emanuele Severino bases his philosophical position entirely on the *principium firmissimum* (Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1006 a 18-25) and understands the primal truth in  $A=A$ : one being equals itself, and that being, qua being, in order to remain that being must be inseparably united to the fact that a being is a being only against all the relations that determine it as a being (Severino, 1984, p. 188), hence the difference between distinction and separation. Concurrently, while addressing truth, language alters truth because it isolates it, separating it from the whole, from totality: words isolate a part and a part of the truth is not the truth. Truth is interrelation and language is supervenience. Yet for Severino there exists that zone of language that coincides with the necessitative logic, which deactivates the linguistic form turning it into something that must be overcome (Severino, 1992, pp. 235-244). Language, however, is not only something whose grammar implies the isolation of elements and consequently their separation from the whole. Language also determines the form of truth as a logical truth with

the power to align all that is isolated earth to itself: even if we were to say that in a given Primal Structure a thing is not that thing, we could never say in the appearance of that thing that that thing is not the thing that appears (Severino, 2012, pp. 121-122). Since language isolates, the product of the separation is another being different from the being of the Primal Structure. The act of saying is such only in relation to the isolated earth, to the finite circle of appearing, where compared to the  $A=A$  of the primal truth, beyond what can be expressed via language, all that remains is a  $\neg A$  (Severino, 2015, p. 85). The sole principle of non-contradiction saturates and completes reality. For Severino, the potential residue – often explained with the metaphor of the net that tries in vain to contain the sea – is contained within the grid of being: the net is a something and the sea is a something, therefore the principle of non-contradiction is that incontrovertible truth that encompasses all which appears. In my opinion, that sea that “is” is only what the net of ontological grammar can contain, because not all of the sea can be contained by the tautology that everything is itself and cannot be other than itself.

Severino provides a logical form to an imagery that precedes any thematization and he needs an imaginary space, not only every time the logical principle must articulate its necessity, in philosophy as well as in eschatology (destiny, appearance, disappearance, pure earth, isolated earth, earth which saves, glory, joy), but also when it must address reality (life, death, violence, technique, history, memory, interpretation). In short, every time there is a shift from being to necessary being, from appearance to its necessity – that is therefore, from appearance to its justice – logic no longer suffices, and must be complemented by imagination. The logic of the incontrovertible proves reliable when it shows it knows how to interpret phenomenological data (first imaginative moment) and discloses a promise that can only be imagined (second imaginative moment). The incontrovertible is not enough if it does not disclose a perspective, because the incontrovertible is itself subject to an aesthetic moment. Without being reliable, the incontrovertible can be read as despotic or simply as indifferent to the existence of the individual.

Sequeri sees sensitivity as a receptor of primal meaning (the generative *chora* parallel to Richir’s *Wesen*). The human connection is grasped via the precision of “impressions”. This is where the difference between empathy-language and code-language emerges via the “empathy-language of the mother”, with its at all times (at every perception) affective flavour – whatever its form, be it a caress or the sound of her voice – the child will later

organize all this content into a linguistic code that is pre-existent to the child and that he or she will use in future. The knowing of the other is precise and comes about via impressions of fondness, tenderness, sadness, and all things part of the sphere of affections. Only later will there be questions and deductions (Sequeri, 2016, p. 145). The “being” of the empathic glance, sound, and gesture is not immediate: what is immediate are instead the a-thematic modulations of affections, which are precise knowledge, experiences of meaning beyond the experience of language.

What is the primal beyond language? What is the primal beyond its logical form? We are inhabited by a precise knowledge before this knowledge has access to any form that may thematize it. Arguing the primal, Severino himself states: «The movement that should lead to meaning is already, since its beginning, inside meaning» (Severino, 2015, p. 70). There exists something that precedes language and that therefore precedes even its logical form. This makes us wonder whether imagination is primal compared to logical form – logical form that for Severino conditions the truth of the imagination, conditions the *Wesen sawvages* that cannot be invalidated by language, but that are the precedent that activates language: form is substance and language is thought. Depending on the form we choose to give to imagination, we will have the justice of its truth.

## The common search of the incontrovertible

Faith can be read as being transcendental, that is, as that necessary opening allowing the subject to position itself before the happening of things.

Without *pístis*, that provides substance to separate things and a subject to the unapparent, *epistème* is void of knowledge (and *pístis* without the *epistème* of affection is blind even to things that are visible) (Sequeri, 2016, p. 132).

Or alternatively, faith can also be read as the gateway to the only possible and not incontrovertible instances.

In an assertion faith is always a self-contradiction (that is to say, it is always a self-contradictory antinomic situation); but *the assertion that is the content of faith is not always self-contradictory* and it is not necessarily one of the forms, that with self-contradiction, are nega-

tion of the primal. It can be, but it also may not. Should it not, we would say that this assertion is neither true nor false, which means that in a moment ulterior to the current situation of the primal it may be verified as true or false (Severino, 1984, p. 99).

I think it is interesting to note how both these orientations are in search of something reliable. Severino argues that initially, to exorcise and set ourselves free from the anguish of death we turned to myth that however proved insufficient precisely because unreliable; our gaze then turned to philosophical knowledge, for its capacity to provide stable and rational lines of reasoning, incontrovertible, therefore reliable, arguments. Contemporary philosophy however, distances itself from absolute truth. Severino assesses the situation starting from the concept of “the death of God” in Nietzsche: it is our faith in becoming that has led to the impossibility of establishing any form of absolute. If becoming is the original evidence, in particular in the form of the human expression of creativity, there cannot exist an all-encompassing absolute, because this absolute would contain what for us would be a new creation but that in truth, since it is contained, has been always existent.

*If there were gods, how could I stand not to be a god! Therefore there are no Gods (Nietzsche, 2006, p. 65).*

The concept of *epistème* in Greek philosophy, which is based on the notion of becoming, has led to the exclusion of the absolute due to its limiting impact on human potential. For Severino philosophy has never conceived that the thought of becoming is a thought of contradiction, a thought of the impossible implying that for a thing to become in time, that thing must be and at the same time must not be that thing. Parmenides’ saying «Being is and cannot not be, non-being is not and cannot in any way be» (Parmenides DK 28 B 2) did not suffice, because it led to the belief that the real world, that evidences becoming, is plain and simple illusion.

Severino describes faith in becoming since becoming is impossible, just like the Western folly and its form of nihilism as a positive affirmation of nothingness.

The contradiction of becoming, in fact, is not purely defined as non-being, that is to say, the being nothing of the being that comes

out of and returns to nothing, but as ‘the overpowering of negative over positive’, as the affirmation of the ‘annulling nothing’ of being. The absurdity of becoming lies not in the fact that the being is not, that the being is nothing. The absurdity of becoming lies in the fact it is the nothing that makes the being nothing, that is to say, the nothing – according to the old lesson – is a positive with the power to annul being (Severino, 2017, pp. 35-36).

If something is itself, statically unable to become anything else, it means that everything is eternal and that reality is the appearing and disappearing of eternals. So, to explain the theoretical structure of appearance we have the famous metaphor that Popper addressed to Einstein: the story of our life is like a series of frames that together form a motion picture, where everything “is” simultaneously but is made real by the projection.

For Sequeri the problem must be placed within the framework of the “ethics of foundations”: we must return deontology of the foundations to ontology of the foundations. To understand the true reasons of the crisis of metaphysics, we should approach the matter starting from the removal of morality of the absolute. The place of moral conversion is tied to the sphere of affections. Moral reasoning cannot prescind from a justice of affection that presents itself as a transcendental phenomenology. The discourse on affection appears to be the one thing that all humans have in common, yet preserving their diversity and sensibility: children don’t learn to cry in their mother tongue. They cry as human beings. Affection is the lowest common denominator of ethics, and this is what makes its discourse intrinsically ontological, founding. The idea of justice transcends conscience which sets itself above the classic transcendentals (truth, good, beauty). The difficulty lies in transporting the ethical into the realm of affection, since the latter is understood as emotional and “vaporous”.

What is presented as the “immorality of the absolute” is basically a rigorous ontic discourse upholding the principle of identity. Morality is decided within the discourse on justice of affection. What is at stake is to understand how being must be in order for it to be the way it should be, and not merely for it to function, to live, to consist or increase. What must be grasped is the necessary being beyond all good reasons, because inside this “necessary being” there is that incontrovertible justice of the human-that-we-all-have-in-common.

Either logical or corresponding to the order of affections, the reliability of both forms of incontrovertible tends towards a necessary being that is

inevitably tied to imagination. I believe it is precisely in the dialectics between being and necessary being that we will be able to discover a Primal Structure that is incontrovertible *and* reliable.

## According to the being qua being of the beings or according to the justice of agàpe?

The things from which (*ex hōn*) there is generation of the beings are the same things in which (*eis taûta*) there is the dissolution (of the beings) according to necessity; in fact these same beings (*autá*) mutually provide justice (*didónai dik n*, do due penance) and reparation for (their) injustice (*tês adikías*), according to the ordinance of time (Anaximander [in Simplicius], DK 12 B 1, as quoted in Severino, 2015, p. 30).

The Anaximander Fragment seems to be the manifesto of Severino's thought, where the truth of being emerges as ultimate justice: but injunction coincides with cognition, and moral necessity coincides with logical necessity.

The problem is very simple: injustice is the isolation determined by the positive signification of nothingness that has determined history in its various forms of nihilism, where given the plausibility that things can simultaneously be and not-be, faith in becoming is what moves the will of the individuals, since individuals believe, delusively, they are living inside the generation and corruption of things. Justice, therefore, must be the beginning of the process of recognising every eternal being as more and more interwoven in its necessary connections inside the Primal Structure. The justice of the destiny of truth and the injustice of the non-truth of nihilism, just like the authentic and inauthentic life in Heidegger's thought, exist in the Primal Structure not as two incompatible dimensions, but rather as two compatible and even mutually necessary and implicating traits.

The point of separation in the definition of necessity of justice is the conviction or non-conviction that the logic formulation  $A=A$  saturates reality. Yet, every time the necessity of imagination in Severino's thinking shifts from being to necessary being, that should be read as a symptom, as a clue. We find ourselves before the counter-intuitive and counter-factual of truth. For Severino and for Sequeri, truth is counter-intuitive and counter-factual. For Severino because the logic incontrovertible reveals the



existential point of view based on becoming, for Sequeri, because to love according to justice is not immediate for anyone. At what price? The existence of the error is a misunderstanding. A mistake is interesting when it introduces us to eternity (Severino, 2015, p. 152), but not quite so interesting when it turns what we existentially feed on into an illusion.

Even when in the isolated earth we think we love or that someone loves us, we are somehow aware that things are not that way, although we make an effort to “reject” this discordant voice (but even during the course of this effort traces of destiny and doubt surface, saying that that love is not what we believe it to be, just like in sorrow one of the two opposing wills negates its existence and the other affirms it) (Severino, 2015, p. 356).

If logic saturates, the real world is that which can be saturated. And what about the rest? It is an illusion or an error as we were saying, or a horror of error. And so, in a whirlwind of necessity, humans are entirely absorbed by an incontrovertible despotism: it is necessary they decide the way they decide. Every time justice is a content, I will have to surrender to error or negotiate to what extent it is legitimate or not legitimate to distance myself from the content in a specific historical moment, or the content will impose itself decreeing what is good and what is bad. Therefore, the shift is from good to affection according to justice (truth-justice). For Severino it is necessary that man decides the way he decides (Severino, 2015, pp. 304-305), and the immorality of the absolute coincides precisely with this ontic rigour. Justice is not a content, but rather a quality of the soul, a sensitivity for the sense of a just form: form is substance, sensitivity is substance. It is clear that will cannot always coincide with violence, because it is a violence of wanting things to be different from what they are, which corresponds to wanting what is impossible.

Violence presupposes an inviolable order to act against. So this means that violence is not wanting what is possible, but wanting the impossible. Educational will is will, will wants the becoming-other of things, and the becoming-other is the impossible. So will and violence are the same. Every will wants the becoming-other, wants the impossible and therefore *every* will is violence (Severino, 2012, p. 97).

The self-referential will that on the logic of the means, in order to reach its ends, interprets reality as something that can be manipulated to its ends is different from that will that wants to stop an aggression and is also different from that will that wants to feed the hungry. Something escapes from the grid of the ontic system and it is when something escapes, when something cannot be symbolised and signified, that justice begins. To think that I cannot change the other introduces me to an ethical discourse on acceptance and establishes a dialogue with the French heritage of Heidegger's thought (Blanchot, Derrida, Lévinas, Nancy); yet there is a difference between solitude and isolation. When there is a content adhering to justice its meaning is univocal and it asserts itself. The same happens in the perspective of the other who appears in my life: if it is necessary for things to be that way, I am a mere spectator of what may happen to me. Contemporary thought introduces the category of alterity, a category that Sequeri underlines is still a way to remain within the ontic discourse, since it revives the characteristics of classical metaphysics. The language of alterity allows the absolute to address the question of its morality, but this alterity is once again despotic, it imposes itself, regardless of any form of justice. There is a shift from the "necessary conditions" of the absolute to the subjection that imposes itself as "moral responsibility". How can we build a bond when in the relationship there is someone, be it God or be it a person that, regardless of everything, establishes itself as "that which is"? What reliability, if any, can there be in a relationship when we must surrender to the consequences of something that has already established itself? The morality of the absolute is not based on the model of the *causa sui* but neither on the model of the *causa aliena*.

*Phanthasia* is a tool that shows us how affection grasped by means of sensitivity brings forth an attachment to that which inhabits memory and inspires expectation and hopes. There is a residue of reality. Compared to conceptual logic, the intuition of a logic of affection wants to be performative: the concept ponders what must be optimised, but proves distortive when it concerns happiness.

Happiness happens on a purely human level and erasing all forms of error does not allow us to get to the question: with no errors and no contradictions we are still missing something, we are still not happy. Affection is that aesthetic creativity which harmonises the promising character of life and which, within its reliability, reveals a justice inherent to it. An eternal justice, of course, but such eternity is not enough to resolve the finite error. Only an eternity capable of bestowing justice can be a reliable eternity. Be-

yond language there is not a Primal Structure merely built on necessary connections. Beyond language there is a primordial impulse structured with ambiguous and ambivalent potential that demands the justice of a form capable of revamping desire in its twofold ethical and testimonial duty towards the meaning of life. Freedom does not derive from logic. Freedom is the courage to not give in to any representation of the world in order to be able to grasp every time the expression that can give shape to the human-that-we-all-have-in-common, so that no one falls victim to affection. Only a justice in the order of affections is capable of retaining the residue and reintroduce the excess. There are many residues, and not all symbolic. What remains in the Primal Structure of the provocation we find in Plato's *Parmenides* about hair, mud and dirt (Plato, *Parmenides*, 130 a3-e4)? Yet Severino states that the eternity of being implies the indispensable nature of each being. If only one single crumb went missing, there would be no infinity. The system inevitably recognises each being but cannot give it justice. "Hair, mud and dirt" are entirely affective. They are not encountered within knowledge but they are tolerated, suffered, and finally removed (Ronchi, 2008, pp. 27-57). What is vile, whatever it might be, lives and finds space within the horizon of a sensitivity willing to take it upon itself. We could say that the residual lives due to the residue of what human capacity to thematize cannot reduce to a phenomenon, to a thing among things. What happens to the outcast, to the innocent victim? What does their destiny say about a truth that simply wanted them that way in the weave of necessary connections?

Justice for Severino and for Sequeri is never given once and for all: the quest of the necessary being is incessant, for Severino in order to eliminate the logical contradiction, and for Sequeri in order to authenticate the order of affections.

The being in the truth is the primal disclosing of meaning that answers the question of the super-transcendental nature of meaning: how should the being be to be as it must? What is the necessary being of being? What is the necessary being of being for it to be reliable?

The simple knowledge of things does not imply any justice, the things that are known as true within my existence are despotic or might be truths that do not describe my life, that is extrinsic truths that can be accepted but that, however, do not pertain to me. In its attempt to rehabilitate an incontrovertible that does not lose reality even from an existential point of view, Severino's Primal Structure risks becoming so distant from human experience that it might become completely irrelevant for everybody,

falling into the paradox of he who in his search for God lost the world of men.

Zarathustra answered: 'I love mankind'. 'Why', asked the saint, 'did I go into the woods and the wilderness in the first place? Was it not because I loved mankind all too much? Now I love God: human beings, I do not love. Human beings are too imperfect a thing for me. Love for human beings would kill me.' [...] 'Do not go to mankind and stay in the woods! Go even to the animals instead! Why do you not want to be like me – a bear among bears, a bird among birds?' [...] But when Zarathustra was alone he spoke thus to his heart: 'Could it be possible! This old saint in the woods has not yet heard the news that *God is dead!* (Nietzsche, 2006, pp. 4-5).

Truth is a ratio and  $A=A$  is insensible. When there is insensibility in what should be the ultimate word on the world, the risk is that someone, as Dostoevsky wrote, might return the ticket (Dostoevsky, 1992, 208). Are we sure that the eternal is enough to resolve the justice of the finite (Žižek, 1997, pp. 89-91)? What eternal can consider itself just without adapting its logic to human existence? The sensitivity of the spirit cannot be brought to an ontic level, this sensitivity is pre-existent to us and we encounter it when we are born.

It is not a matter of mere emotion, but of establishing the truth-justice nexus of the Primal Structure. Tragedy cannot be absorbed in the being/non-being dialectics (Sequeri, 1996, pp. 463-464); from this point of view Severino offers a significant contribution, because on the one hand, man can no longer be thought of in relation to nothingness, on the other, evil cannot be reduced to the incumbency of nothingness. Severino clarifies that everything is because everything is an eternal being, but there are some beings that although being true, must be fought, because we cannot obey the rigour of a truth that does not obey the justice of meaning, the justice of affection. Only that which is just deserves to be, only that which is just deserves to be eternally and must necessarily be for eternity. Justice is that something that is eternally worth somebody's affection even if the world were to end: the justice of affections understood as the logical form of eternity.

There is a primal form that bestows justice beyond any rational logic against error or in favour of optimization. One learns to love in a counter-intuitive and counter-factual way but such form, such justice, accomplishes all destinations of Destiny. I believe it might be of interest to reconsider

the persyntax of Severino's Structure in the light of a justice of affections understood as a necessary condition to that particular overcoming that might be identified with Glory; only on the condition that deontology of the foundation is reconnected to the ontology of the foundation.

We need to rethink error where the truth that attests all things is structured with the theoretical register of appearing. It would also be interesting to use the grammar of generation to read that particular appearing as (make)-being in affection (Sequeri, 2012, pp. 115-116). The absolute of the identical is affection.

## Traces of deontology

For Severino death coincides with the death of empirical will. Will is faith in the impossible, that is, wanting that things can be, can become, something different from what they are. Wanting the impossible is the root of all pain. Severino's eschatology implied by the theoretical concept of overcoming with the preservation of the eternal, reveals an inner and implicit axiology tied to the elementary experiences of life such as overcoming pain and heading towards joy. Could it be that the Primal Structure contains an axiology, somehow? This means that in the glance of destiny, the appearing of this necessity is the will with which destiny wants (while overcoming it) the totality of pain (Severino, 2015, p. 359).

With the death of empirical will, isolated earth stops supervening and pure earth appears as no longer contrasted by isolation. The isolation of the earth has been accomplished, the series of events that composes the single isolated earth has ended and this implies its fading out in all the circles of destiny and the advent of the earth that saves (Severino, 2001, pp. 499-563).

Formally denied, faith in isolated earth continues appearing, at least in the primal circle, yet, still without the earth that saves supervening. This accomplishment signals the defining of a series (no other determinations of isolated earth and of pure earth supervene), that is the history of the single individual, but the death of one empirical will is not the death of all the empirical wills, necessary condition for the advent of the earth that saves to resolve all the contradictions of isolated earth. The splendour of Joy is static; time does not flow because no eternal supervenes: so the first light with no interval will be the Glory of Joy.

The background of this circle is the persyntax, the content that appears

in a finite circle of destiny with the death of empirical will. The background (Severino, 2011, p. 415) is “larger” than the pure earth and it includes the destination pertaining to each circle. I believe that it is precisely with the concept of “destination” (Severino, 2001, pp. 502-503 and 2015, pp. 247-249) that we start to grasp the presence of traces of deontology in Severino. Glory is from eternity with regard to the meaning of a single circle, the Glory of Joy that is, the Glory of each history of each I of destiny. The destination is the specific way each circle has of manifesting the common structure and Severino adds one detail that in my opinion is no small thing. Let’s bear in mind that the exceptions to a theory is where the great truths of the theory itself can be grasped. Each destination is specific to each circle, the destination differentiates each circle from another and it cannot be a persyntactic dimension. Severino writes: «[The destination] is the only iposyntactic dimension belonging to the background, the only iposyntactic determination that in the circles of the finite appearing of destiny, does not belong to the earth» (Severino, 2011, p. 416), and this is the condition that allows the background, that is identical in each circle, to be necessarily united to infinite different destinations (Severino, 2007, pp. 389-429). Severino’s eschatology is the imagined necessity, and although we know all we need to overcome are the contradictions, the Primal Structure takes care of the elementary facts of each individual life, destiny wants the Glory of Joy of each one of us, all the necessary connections are set out in order for the history of each one of us to be in the Glory. With regard to the contradiction C, the eternity of each “singularity” finds its necessary conditions inside the Primal Structure: because the infinite of destiny cannot appear in the finite circle of destiny, the destination is implied. After all, it’s the elementary facts that instruct logic in its necessity in order to determine what happens at the death of an empirical will. Pain is overcome and Joy is the direction. Why isn’t the Primal Structure indifferent to the problems of our existence? Why should the removal of contradiction correspond to a solution of existential problems?

Glory is the tangible everything that in the impossibility of appearing in the finite circle requires its infinite manifestation.

Addressing the ‘dead’ means addressing the eternal and their eternal thrones. And the eternal thrones are also the living who authentically address the dead. But the thrones of the dead are the wisdom of destiny, no longer contrasted by the isolation of the earth. In the thrones of the living this wisdom is instead still contrasted by such isolation (Severino, 2011, p. 430).

Glory is in the isolated earth, in the gift of the destiny of eternity of being qua being; Glory is in the pure earth that is not contrasted by isolation, that is the truth of the life of each of us; and formally in its infinite manifestation, Glory is in the arrival of the earth that saves after the instant where time has not gone by, since the eternal does not supervene in the finite circle and isolation has faded in all finite circles. Even though isolated earth is the appearing of the appearing of appearing, and hence not an illusion but the folly of will that wants other from itself, dispersing all the justice of affection and reducing an innocent victim or severe illness merely to pain deriving from contradiction (Severino, 2011, pp. 546-547), Glory is there to accompany, the eternity of Glory is always present.

The truth's negation of erring (and of error) is the opposite of the indifference for erring and the error [...] 'This life of ours' 'continues infinitely' in the sense that the eternal infinite expanse of the overcoming of erring – the eternal expanse where the passion of the truth of erring, the eternal infinite expanse of the Glory and of the Glory of Joy exist together – manifests itself infinitely in the circles of our being 'I' of destiny. And the place that is at the beginning of that eternal expanse is the summoning of all 'our lives' in the event that unites 'good friday' and 'easter' (Severino, 2011, pp. 555-557).

Yet in a different way, in the truth of every I of destiny: and a justice of affections is sought, too.

Isolated earth is that form of appearing in which primal faith resides. It appears in the final circle of destiny. Among the contents of isolated earth there appears the place where pain and pleasure, understood in the broadest sense, are more intense – pain and pleasure that are also the opposite extremes encompassing all shades of 'affection' and which make that place the fundamental state of affection (Severino, 2011, p. 449).

Severino realizes that affection requires justice, but reduces pleasure to what is wanted and pain to what is rejected, that is, to that affective insufficiency already displayed by narcissism, self-referential affection, in the isolated earth. Narcissism can't be solved by deconstructing will, but rather by directing will towards its own justice and therefore towards what deserves to be in eternity. The truth of destination that Severino senses in the foundation is the justice that has always inhabited the human. There exists

a good fraction of the I that knows how to generate the human, because love descends and the world thrives on that dispersal that does not make a narcissistic return. The fundamental question is not “Who am I?” but “Who am I for?” Human tradition of remains alive because many human beings at a certain point of their lives, look around and ask themselves, more or less confusedly “Who am I for?”. This happens because if one does not find the things, the thoughts, the generation, the invention, the creation, the intelligence, the affections, the connections one is destined for, one dies.

If we spend our lives trying to succeed, to nurture ourselves, to clarify ourselves, to investigate ourselves, we are dead. If we find “who” we are living “for”, we become enthusiastic about life, we experience happiness. All the parts of ourselves that find their own destination blossom, become beautiful, exciting, thrilling and are worth many sacrifices. According to Severino’s philosophical position however, although trying to include the elementary experiences of life, destination only offers a limited justice consisting in the removal of contradictions, ultimately translating into depriving the human of its quintessentially human experience. Eternity is not enough to be Glory of the finite. Only a just eternity – in keeping with an ontology that knows how to distance itself from the ontic dimension including those residues that move even the imagination of the most impeccably exact and coherent systems – can be the justice of affection. The incontrovertible is not enough to be reliable if justice doesn’t take responsibility for a destination of the experience of the truth of the human-that-we-all-have-in-common. Severino seems to understand this: «Destiny is the *truth of obtaining*, that is to say the truth of *satisfaction*, of *pleasure*, and thus of *happiness*. The truth of the state of affection that is united to the truth-of-the-will-that-obtains is first and foremost the background and therefore the destination of the circles of destiny. This truth is the dawn of Joy (that therefore is not a ‘psychologic’ determination since it is a dimension that belongs to the empirical I of will). The dawn of Joy appears already forever» (Severino, 2011, pp. 450-451). The matter at stake here is the rediscovery within the primal of imagination of those residues that logical form is not capable of saturating, and the understanding of the justice of necessity.

In line with Derrida’s deconstruction theories, I believe that formulas wear out and I appreciate Severino’s deconstruction of *creatio ex nihilo* and of the concept of resurrection (Severino, 2015, pp. 288-291), welcoming the Hegelian provocation about the unreasonableness of a resurrection



that looks like a rabbit pulled out of a hat or a lucky lottery win. I believe that eternity inscribed in the truth-justice nexus of the Primal Structure is an undeniable gain, but instead of a grammar of being built on the *principium firmissimum*, I would posit, based on an epistemology of imagination, a grammar of the modular being: the world is made of quantities and of qualities but also of the graduality of things.

The divide, which undermines affection precisely because it has not been taken into account in the definition, is unbridgeable in the logic of entitative evidence and its cognitive appearance: a good that is good *per se* does not need to prove its authenticity, all it needs to do is be an object of desire with a correspondence in the subject. The “necessity of the just-being and of affection” *emerges* in its difference from the truth and from the good, but it is not *constituted* by the opposition to them. All the contrary. Yet, it experiences its unity and its difference in the divide and in the *modal fulfilment* of truth and of good: irreducible and incommensurable to the epistemic and ontical resolution of their identity essence (and reality) (Sequeri, 2016, p. 132).

To reabsorb the importance of graduality means returning to the ontic register of black and of white, of the all and of the nothing. Graduality is necessary for a justice of the being: shades of yellows, shades of reds, shades of greens. In relations and in experiences it is really a matter of colour tones and sound tonalities.

Being-as-a-modulation is what is grasped by sensitivity to sense. The variations of the body are phenomena of the spiritual quality. This is true for a plant, a stone, and particularly for a human being, and it is also true for God. The experience of eternity is the experience of sensitivity: the primal experience of the body that cannot be reduced to the experience of the perceived mortal body. The Primal Structure is the modal Primal Structure of the sensitive being. A finite being can never cease starting, never cease being born, never cease finishing, and as a consequence individuals experience being eternal.

Deleuze refers to an example Spinoza gave, which I believe is very interesting: an all-white immaculately clean wall, with two figures drawn on it in pencil. When the wall was completely clean, before they were drawn, did the two figures exist? Could they have existed somehow before they were drawn? Could they exist independently of the wall? Spinoza’s answer is no. Where can this image take us, asks Deleuze. How can we identify

the essences, the singular relations, the actual relations that are not occurring? What can a body do?

Death will never concern neither the constitutive relationship itself nor the essence of the individual. [...] The relationship itself conveys the essence of the body, regardless of its actual fulfillment and of the elements that take part in it. The relationship and the essence are eternal - and we are not talking about a metaphorical eternity at all. [...] The essence of a body exists before it and continues to exist after it. (Deleuze, 2007, pp. 151-152)

The white colour of the wall is present in its various shades. The tone of the colour white can change. The tone of the colour is something different from the drawn figures. The experience of eternity does not correspond to the indefinite experience of immortality. If imagination is primal, if imagination is what allows us to desire, if by welcoming the responsibility of our desire we look for that existential form that knows how to safeguard the human-that-we-all-have-in-common, if there uncontrovertibly exists a justice of this desire inside the order of affections, then the experience of what deserves to be in eternity is possible.

The difference introduced by that ontic-ethical level that we have thematized in this paper can be considered from two different standpoints: from a philosophical and a theological (revealed theology) standpoint. Both systems affirm the un-deductible quality of the ethical dimension as opposed to that of a simple ontic description of reality, and particularly of a neoparmenidean ontological description such as Emanuele Severino's. The specific difference that, in the light of Pierangelo Sequeri's theoretical-theological lesson we can formulate on the basis of the previously collected reflections and that can concern the theological *proprium* of a primal structure theory, consists in the articulation of an ontology of a primal affection. This involves a re-figuration of the logic of the onto-logic, which in this framework coincides with the grammar of the truth of the justice of affections. This grammar is in fact the sensitivity for that sense that occurs beyond any language thematization. In the context of Christian theology, the incarnation of the Son in Jesus of Nazareth, the incarnated Logos, the manifest grammar of being, becomes, in his human historical quality, the revelation of the truth-justice nexus of the Primal Structure. His resurrection is the eternal of *agàpe*, form and destination of every human. The wording "be created in Christ" (Col 1,15-17) indicates that justice that is

the experience of eternity for every human, the discriminant of what deserves eternity, that something that is eternally valid even if the world should end. This is the origin of each overcoming, as the Pauline script reminds us: «And though I have the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries, and all knowledge; and though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not *agàpe*, I am nothing» (1 Cor 13,2).

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