The Truth of Being between Unconditional and Conditional

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The essay starts from the distinction between the being that is unconditional and the being that happens in a conditional way, that is within the limits of our experience and our existence. The synthesis of unconditional and what is conditional implies overcoming the features of being that are deficient and distressing and do not deserve to remain. This is the issue of the ontology that has to be completed by an axiology. According to the Author, the negative can be present in the "Glory" only as taken away within a dimension of transcendence. And so philosophy, at the peak of the supreme care for the sense of being, opens itself to a promise of salvation. Furthermore, because we do not have now the full manifestation of truth, the latter, unlike what Severino thought, needs a faith as keeping its perspective.

Keywords:

truth, unconditional being, conditional being, onto-axiology, salvation, faith

1. Being that is and being that happens

The masterwork *The Primal Structure* of Emanuele Severino underlies my reflection. In the first edition of that work, dated 1958, Severino was still opened to the possibility of a theological dimension, although in a more recent book the Author excluded that such an opening to a divine being, in a privileged position in comparison to a common being, was the core of that essay (see Severino, 2018, pp. 209-213). Thus, the key point of my considerations is about the relationship of distinction between being that is and being that happens. That kind of distinction is suggested by a double question. The first question sounds with following words: to what extent can we affirm the absolute and unconditional feature of truth? The second question is strictly linked to the first one: when is truth conditioned by limits that mark its feature as relative and unstable? So, we have to give reasons to affirm both: something that can be said as unconditional, clarifying why its meaning is absolute, and something that we have to say as conditioned, because its meaning is relative. A path like this shall require not only to say in a different, but not contradictory way, either the being that is or the being that happens, it shall also require to show their structural interweaving.

Method and entire

The method – *metá* (towards) *odón* (path) – of thinking in a philosophical way doesn't involve taking any road, but taking up a journey that is oriented to the *entire*. The question is precisely that: starting from what are we pulled when we think from a philosophical point of view? The "from what" are we attracted as *philosophers* is the figure of entire. The philosophical path is marked by a primal opening to the entire. Now we can ask: what is consistent with this primal opening? We can answer that



thinking in line with the intentionality of entire shall require not to back down from the challenge of thinking, first of all, what is *up* to the entire. In line with the entirety of primal intentionality of thought is the meaning of being that cannot but be, thus the meaning of unconditional being. Unconditional being is being that overcomes the contradiction of negative, because the negation of being negates itself and its meaning consists in the semantic function of letting us say the being that is freed from the contradiction. The negation dissolves in signifying being from which it is excluded. The positivity of negation of being consists in letting show the absolute positivity of being, while negation of being does not have its own content; its meaning lies in letting us say its contradictory, that is the being. Being is thought in relationship to a not being that is taken away; so not being is put as taken away. A disturbing question remains: how do we explain our ability not only to think "not being" starting from being, but also to think "not being" as the primal foundation of being and as its point of arrival? Why can one even be attracted by not being and consider the nothing more primal than being? The separation of the thought of "not being" from the thought of being, from which the first starts - since there is in any case something rather than nothing - and in which it is resolved, is perhaps the exercise of a diabállein (namely "to separate") always rooted in the human.

3. The "unconditional" and its contradiction

The unconditional always gives itself to us within the limits of our condition, where the primal opening narrows in the contradiction of our experience and our existence. The contradiction is twofold, because it regards both ontology and gnoseology. Not only are we not the whole or the entire; it is not even evident in a determined way how we are linked to entire. What does not appear for us is how we are included within the entire. Therefore, what should appear does not appear to us, that is, how we are included within the being what is in an absolute way and so without any contradiction. All that has to do with what Severino declares, from The Primal Structure to the last book Testifying the Destiny (2019) as "contradiction C". According to me, contradiction C can be considered the real thorn in the side of conceptual apparatus not only of the work The Primal Structure (including the second edition of 1981), given that it is also present in the new course that begins with Destiny of Necessity

(1980) and marks a fertile furrow to insert critical observations that I will try to make.

The opening of the entire narrows in the bounds of existence. Existential context is marked by coming to light of a deficiency: content of the being absolutely free of contradiction does not appear in the way it should appear, and thus it is not *for us*. So being's scenery splits into twofold aspects: *being for itself* and *being for us*, absolute being and relative being. That means that existence – any being within the existence – has the dignity of being and so it has the right to be as included within an unconditional positivity; nevertheless any existent in a conditioned situation does not know the ways of inclusion and, due of this lack of knowing, suffers a distance from being that is relevant to it and also belongs to it. Being that is *in us* and *for us* is accompanied by contradiction, which is not absolute but relative to us. The being's *event* within the field of experience is inadequate to the fullness of being and, since this fullness does not appear, we could say that being that happens is a not yet being.

The truth of being consists properly in the full manifestation of being and, for this reason, is for us a goal that has to come. The manifestation of truth is given to us always incomplete. Since every being within the conditions of existence is inadequate in comparison of its fullness and thus it does not presume to can own the identity with the entire, the latter could only be approximated through multiple perspectives converging to the same point of attraction. That does not mean that perspectives are necessarily coinciding, because convergence can also be pursued through oppositions, provided they are not destructive.

4. Ethics as approximation to the Being

For each being in a conditioned situation, the path of approach to the entire assumes the character of a task that involves the totality of existence. Such a task not only involves the intentionality of knowledge; it also implies practical tension. Indeed, the deep meaning of praxis is to tend to manifestation of being that still does not appear to us, that is it consists in making-happen-for-us the Being that is for itself. This kind of praxis or, we can say, of action is not any practice, but it can be qualified as an ontological one. If we consider action in its essential constitution and how it unfolds, we can highlight *who* acts. Here Human enters the scene and Human expresses itself according to its structure with its fundamental fea-



tures. So, three dimensions stand out within human being; dimensions that we can find in the course of history and we can assume as *almost transcendental*, that is as transcendental elements at anthropological level. Human is a place where come together ability to be, ability to act in view of being, ability of having things that is not detachable from acting and being. The sense of human experience is played indeed in the overall task of making happen the being for us.

5. Right to be and quality of being

In a situation of conditionality in which we are, we know we belong to positivity of unconditional being, nevertheless we do not know how our belonging to the unconditional being will manifest itself to us. At the heart of this question we have to ask: the synthesis of unconditional and what is conditional, which is waited by us although it is not manifested yet, implies that any feature or modus essendi of conditional being, within our experience, has to be taken in a synthesis like that? Or else there are, within the sphere of our experience, features of being that are deficient and distressing, going from material to immaterial sufferings, that do not deserve to remain? We cannot avoid a crucial question like that: in the event that deficiency and suffering had even to persist and perpetuate within the joining of conditional and unconditional, we would reduce necessarily the latter to a role of impotent ratification of negativity of any existent.

Therefore: how could we overshadow the issue of the *quality-of-being*? Considering quality of being means to satisfy in an adequate measure the right to be that belongs to the whole of being and so to every singular manifestation within it, that is to every being. Should not we, therefore, design a quality enhancement regarding all that is worthy to be in every being? That would mean to put a *difference* between the being that is "isolated" from the unconditional being and the same being that has overcome such an isolation. We could find a leverage point to support this difference in one of the most important works of Severino:

That the concrete passing beyond the contradiction implies the concrete appearing of what is passed beyond, it does not exclude the *difference* between the being that appears in its not be passed beyond and "the same being" that appears within the context that passes it beyond. Within the infinite and eternally accomplished

passing beyond, what is passed beyond appears in its total concreteness, even if another – that is, something different – is a being that appears together with that to which it is necessarily connected; and another is "this same being" in so far as it appears outside that relationship (Severino, 2001, pp. 538-539).

Nevertheless, Severino thinks that everything of experience (for instance both pleasure and pain) has to be included within the infinite appearing and its context. The reason of that inclusion – at risk of simplifying - might be this: if any element or aspect of finite experience was not included within the infinite, the latter would not be infinite. In other words, if something remained out of infinity, consequently the infinity itself, devoid of something, whatever it is, would no longer be such; more essentially: the infinite would be at the same time not-infinite. I would approach this explanation to a following important statement of Severino in the same work, when he says that "within the infinite appearing no being (essente) can supervene (sopraggiungere)" (p. 541). Indeed, we have to recognize that if some being could arrive yet within the infinite, that would mean that infinite was not actually infinite before the arrival of that being, since it would have been of course lacking of that new arrival. Moreover, if the infinite had to foresee that further contents could arrive, infinite itself would be damned to never be infinite.

6. A critique to Severino's vision of relationship between finite and infinite

About this issue, we could object that a concern like that is possible only if the infinite is conceived, so to say, in a quantitative way. Such a vision would mean that any increase of its content would imply, inevitably, its downgrade. At this point our question would be: could infinite being welcome finite beings, improving their finite condition, without implying a downgrade for itself? I would be inclined to think that the infinite, precisely because it is such, would not be conditioned by the bestowal or by the outpouring of the fullness of being in favor of beings who are devoid of it. The concept of infinite, thought in a qualitative way as positivity without limits, demands that it cannot be changed because all realizations are included in it, while the realm of finiteness needs its own change in the relationship with the infinite, due to its lack of fullness.

And this relationship, considered the vision of the infiniteness that coincides with being without negativity, cannot be but towards a better being. The fullness bestowed upon finite beings, therefore the change due to the coming of a new relation between infinity and finite, should not cause infinity to increase or decrease. Therefore, the infinite can be extraneous to the logic of increment-decrement, which is immeasurable with it. The logic of infinite could be a logic of overabundance, which cannot be undermined by the arrival of a new relation of the finite to the infinite, due to the attainment of the fullness of the finite. To come would be the new condition of the finite and not the un-conditionality of the infinite being. This means, precisely, moving from a quantitative view of infinity to a qualitative one.

About this, theological thought can interpret the fulfillment of the finite, thanks to the relationship with the infinite, as an act of donation by the latter. Such a donation could be also named "love" of God for humans and for everything that belongs to the sphere of finiteness. To be rigorous, we must however admit that a theological interpretation of the unconditional being is only possible if we consider the latter "as a person", who is in a relationship with us "as persons". Passing from a notion of unconditional being to an image of God-person needs indeed a radical turn of philosophical intentionality.

Let come back to our critique regarding Severino's vision of relationship finite-infinite. Severino manages to avoid a contradiction in which infinite could fall if it did not contain the totality of contents whatever they are, but what is the quality of them? Severino does not put the question about the quality of contents that infinite would embrace. For this reason he does not manage to avoid a more important contradiction concerning infinite, that is a qualitative contradiction. Indeed, if the infinite – the absolutely absolute – had also to contain the deficit elements of beings, the result would be the permanence of negative within the absolute positivity of infinite being. To better say, the lack of fullness of beings within our experience would be a definitive feature of beings taken in their fullness (which is attainable thanks to the full appearing of the relationship between infinite and finite). The infinite positivity of being would be contradicted by not positivity. To avoid a contradiction like this, we should interpret the difference between the being that is "isolated" from the unconditional being, and the same being that has overcome such an isolation, as transcendence. Beings that get free from any negativity appearing within the limits of experience are assumed in a dimension that is transcending

experience. Transcendence would be the full expression of the difference between fullness of beings and their lack of fullness. . . Severino is undoubtedly opposed to a transcendence that means a radical removal of the negative of every isolated earth, because not yet appeared in the unfolding of glory.

Therefore he says:

In the gaze of the destiny of truth it appears [...] the *necessity* that "the Holy Friday" of the solitude of the lands of the circles does not precede but appears together with its own sunset; that is, that the *tremendum* is not left to itself and to its horror, but appears in the very act in which it is surpassed by the "Easter" of the freedom of destiny. [...] In that glance, therefore, there appears the necessity for the extreme abyss of pain and death, which must open up into the finite, to manifest itself in the very event in which it is overstepped, that is, at the same time in which it manifests, in the new glow of Joy – in the Glory of Joy – , its own fulfillment and its own be passed (*Glory*, pp. 543-544).

Then, in the Glory of Joy, must the extreme abyss of pain and death, as a figure of the negative within the experience, remain as a negative? Or the negative can be present in the Glory only as taken away, like the negative with which it engages "the being that cannot not be", rightly to take it away? Putting the negative - every negative - as removed is precisely the figure of transcendence. If the negative - relatively negative - accepted in the unconditional being cannot be identical to the negative isolated from it, putting the difference between these two states means precisely that the second of them transcends the first. It would be contradictory if the two different states were identical, that is that the negative separated from the fullness of the positive coincides with the negative assumed in such fullness, where the negative could remain only as removed.

7. Onto-axiologie and salvation

In this folds of our reflection is placed meta-physics as enhancement of ontological dignity. If it is innervated by metaphysical enhancement, ontology cannot fail to result in an onto-axiology, that is in an ontology at the height of being's value, to not fall into senselessness of the negative. And then philosophy, at the peak of the supreme care for the sense of being,



takes itself to the threshold where it is possible to listen to the promise of salvation. Where can the promise of salvation come from if not from a Being who does not suffer the insuperable conditioning of finiteness? So salvation refers to an un-finite being, which transcends the finiteness but in an inclusive relationship with it, and therefore able to realize that ontological gain sculpted in a formula that we can take from Augustine and put in a nutshell: "nothing will be lacking of what was and there will be what was lacking" (Augustinus Hipponensis, *De Civitate Dei*, Liber XXII, cap. 14). To be precise, in that context the Author faces an issue regarding the feature of children's body when they will resurrect, affirming that it will have the dimensions of a complete physical development; Augustine says referring to Luke, 21.18: "In sententia quippe Domini, qua ait: *Capillus capitis vestri non peribit*, dictum est non defuturum esse quod fuit, non autem negatum est adfuturum esse quod defuit").

The argument in favor of transcendence that we have indicated above is based on the necessity to give a full realization to beings otherwise uncompleted. In that case transcendence acts as a pushing force towards a completion of existence. We have to add that transcendence can also attract lives that have succeeded, but are not closed in a sort of complacency of their limits and, on the contrary, are open to an overabundance of sense. Transcendence as completion of lacking existences and transcendence as excess for lives rich in successes are interwoven.

8. A comparison with Severino about being and being other

Previous considerations show a substantial debt to Severino's conception of process of becoming. Based on his conception, we have not to read becoming and its contents as coming from nothing and going to nothing. Instead we have to read becoming as a flow of appearing and not appearing beings, about which we cannot negate their permanence. This agreement must confront the sharpening of Severino's theorization about "being" and "being other" dating from *Beyond the language* (1992) and *Tautótēs* (1995). Thus, I try to give reasons for both convergences and divergences.

It is evident that a "soteriological" discourse leading to the figure of transcendence requires a transition to an *otherness*, that is to another level consisting in a step up of the "eternal beings", while an intransigent version of the principle of contradiction should refuse the possibility to think that the identity of being-itself can turn in an otherness meant as not identity. Such

a prohibition also involves the *status* of praxis, which is considered an unsustainable pretension to produce the transformation of beings. In order to break the ban or to overcome the reasons which oppose both the claims to affirm a transcendent dimension and the claims of a transformative practice, some interpretations of Severino's thought emphasize a significant difference between the first and the second period of his philosophy, expressing the opinion that the positions of the first Severino allow the possibility of both transcendence and praxis, that only the second Severino would have ruled out. I would rather support the view that we have just to tackle head on the issue that is linked to the radical turn that the philosopher made in the nineties, when he arrived to equate two different matters: being that cannot but be (or being that excludes not being) and being that cannot be other than itself (being excluding its becoming other). About such an equivalence, on the contrary we wonder if we are allowed to distinguish the issue of being from that of other. The question is precisely that: can we really equate the issue of other to the issue of becoming nothing?

In the book *Disputes* (p. 146), Severino states about the flow of incoming of eternal beings: "the variation in the content of the totality of what appears" means "starting to appear of an eternal that is *other* from eternals that already appear". Thus, to say it briefly, if there is a "variation" within the system of *Eternals*, the "other" that is considered according to the register of eternal being is not the same "other" that is considered according to the register of becoming from nothingness and going to nothingness.

So, if we conceive salvation as giving to beings the fullness of their being, and if we figure praxis as making happen eternal being into the sphere of beings that already appear, being's variation that is involved in tending to salvation and in engaging in praxis is not tinged with the colors of nihilism. With a quick hint we can notice that – as Severino does not fail to point out – the *language* speaking the truth is a kind of transforming praxis, since it wants to induce a paradigm shift in comparison of the traditional one. The language of truth is therefore a vehicle of an even indispensable transformation.

9. The serious case of creation

Furthermore, about the salvation we touch in short the uncovered nerve of the figure of the creator God, which was the object of a Gigantomachy between Severino and Gustavo Bontadini (about the "principle of Cre-



ation", which Bontadini supported, I advanced an interpretation of it as metaphor, which I based on the same words of the Author in the essay Σώζειν τὰ φαινόμενα, in Id., Conversations of Metaphysics, II, p. 145: "we are dealing with a concept that is analogic, symbolic, 'introduced' [....] therefore surrounded by a halo of darkness"; on the issue, I refer to Totaro, 2013, pp. 57-62). According to me, the figure of God who creates depends on the figure of God who saves, and cannot spun off from it. Extrapolated from the concrete union with the promise of salvation, the principle of creation entered into symbiosis with the principle of cause. Causal explanation was yet gradually removed from its metaphysical value, and in the modern era it has become fruitful in the exploration of the cause-effect connections within the physical-mathematical sciences, although we know that, with the advent of quantum physics, the transition to the indeterminist principle and stochastic-probabilistic logic has been affirmed . The "Creation" was then interpreted as a particular case of the principle of causality and the image of God was assimilated to the physical-mathematical scheme of the cause that produces effects according to a relationship of equivalence. For instance, if we consider the famous Spinoza's formula Deus sive natura, we cannot avoid to notice that it is based on the principle of a perfect equation of the cause with its effects.

On the contrary, we have to free the concept of God from concept of the cause and from relationship cause-effects. If we de-causalize, so to say, the notion of creation, we also put an end to the improper controversies – e.g. the emblematic controversy with evolutionistic theories – with the explanations of the hard sciences elaborated in modernity and their ulterior development. What does remain after such a renounce to a metaphysical use of the principle of causality? The central core of the idea of God as the foundation of what cannot be given by itself certainly remains valid. We have to precise that when we speak about beings (entia) that cannot give being to itself by itself, we mean beings that cannot reach by itself fullness of being. Indeed, we have stated, within the entire – or the whole – of being, a difference between unconditional being and conditional one. Conditioned beings are oriented to, and attracted by, unconditioned being to realize their ontological fullness. On this way we can purge the idea of a foundation in God of a nihilistic version, because foundation means referring to an unconditional being that, in the perfect realization and expansion of being itself, is able to call to a full realization conditioned beings, provided that they already have in themselves the dignity of being and the right to its own completion.

10. Appearance of finiteness and manifestation of absoluteness

The hermeneutics of the relationship between God and the world of experience, as relationship between unconditional being and conditional beings, brings us back to the relationship between appearing of finiteness and manifestation of absoluteness. In Passing beyond (pp. 537-538), we read:

when the isolated earth sets, the necessary decipherment of the traces left in it by the All implies that the infinite All, concretely considered, supervenes in flesh and bone in the infinite constellation of finite circles, but that it supervenes as what appears there, precisely, in this constellation, and therefore in a dimension that, despite its infinity, is a finite dimension. The Infinite Supervening All in its concreteness is indeed the absolute manifestation of being but within the limits of that finite dimension [scilicet: the size of the constellation of finite circles, which, in spite of its infinity, is a finite dimension], that is, in that it [infinity] is present in the gaze of such a dimension [finite], and therefore not as absolutely absolute [my italics1.

It is clear that the constant feature of Severino's thought is the attempt to conjugate finite and infinite, rooting the infinite in the finite. Nevertheless, the distinction remains firm between the absolute that is intertwined with the parts, namely with the constellation of finite circles, and what he calls the "absolutely absolute". The latter neither appears as whole within a particular circle of what appears nor can coincide with the constellation of parts in their sequence. There is not a correspondence between the formal opening of absolutely absolute, which should embrace every positive being in the sequence of the particular circles, and the already realized fullness of its contents. Such a matching is not possible because the chain of finite circles cannot adequate the infinity of the absolutely absolute. It remains, in a permanent way, a distance between the two dimensions. The permanence of distance means that the recurrent "contradiction C" in Severino's thought does not receive a solution.

Likely a synthesis would only be possible to the eyes, so to say, of somebody who could put together infinite and finite, embracing the entire or the whole where the positivity of conditioned beings can realize its own fullness within the unconditioned positivity of the being without limits. That would mean to introduce an almighty God, whose idea is perhaps the restless underground of the apparently compact reflection of our philosopher. That would be, of course, a path to explore. It remains that the concreteness of the "absolute" cannot be realized, as such, thanks to going to the infinite or, better, to the *in-definitum*, of singles circles of the process and its sequence. Therefore, the appearing of "Glory" within particular circles of the process cannot be but a glow as immense as irreducibly formal, since the form is empty of content or, better to say, an adequate content does not match with its formal anticipation. The Glory is always moved forward and its full extension to the totality of particular circles does not appear. I think that such a consideration is also appropriate to the transcendental consciousness as eternal scenery of all empirical consciousnesses, because that scenery too is not fulfilled by the totality of contents, which, on the contrary, appear and disappear although the formal opening of transcendental consciousness itself. For this reason, the vision of the whole, and vision of the finite in its placement within the whole, remains unaccomplished. Definitely, the Glory should involve a going of finite beyond the isolated earth, and beyond death as annihilation, but Glory is not present, since the synthesis of finite, or of "relatively absolute", with "absolutely absolute" does not appear.

The infinite leaves a trace in every happening that "arrives" within the finite, receiving in turn this trace, but it itself is the not coming or, more exactly, is the coming All, in the process of the coming of finite circles, that is still not coming. The absolutely absolute cannot be diluted in the always relatively absolutes, that consist in the appearing circles. Distance between coming (finite) and not coming (infinite) is persistent. No overlap is given between the two dimensions. The relative absolute lives in an incessant tension to the absolutely absolute, in whose conjunction the brightness of Glory and the fullness of Joy should be reached, but it is not lord of the ways that lead to the goal; it is always *in itinere*.

11. Truth and faith

The truth of being, concretely considered, should consist in a situation where the contradiction due to the distance between relative and absolute would overcome. Actually, we do not have *right now* the vision of a synthesis of relative and absolute. More precisely, the truth to which we can approach, according to our 'catching' it is not able to master the ways of such a synthesis. In short, we do not have the vision of a truth fully unfold. That means that we have reasons to *trust* in a truth that we think as

absolute, but do not know in its full manifestation. We *believe* to can see what in the present we do not see. We know that a goal for us does exist; nevertheless, we do not see how that goal manifests itself in its determinations. Not seeing what we *have to see* is precisely the condition of the opening of truth to the faith. Truth aiming at its full manifestation needs faith. A truth that keeps aiming at what it does not see (if not partially), has to recognize its opening to faith. The path of truth becomes the path of faith. The truth continues as faith. Faith is a necessity – more than a need – of the truth.

About that, we can refer, though in a context that is not philosophical, to words of Paul in the Second Epistle to the Corinthians 5,7-8: "dià písteos gàr peripatoûmen, ou dià eídous" ("we walk by faith, not by sight"). The "epistéme" leads to the "pistis", which is based on a vision that manifests itself as imperfect. Faith means a not seeing that is rooted in seeing.

Severino says that faith is to believe as incontrovertible what it is not incontrovertible, but only believed and wanted. Therefore faith would be a negation of truth and a sort of violence against truth. In other words, faith would mean to declare visible what is invisible and so can only be believed; consequently, we should not sell faith as truth. What to say about that issue? Without any doubt, the place of truth is a vision that finds its expression in an incontrovertible logos. We can remember that Severino, since the *Primal Structure*, has spoken about truth as logical-phenomenological immediateness. Just based on that feature of the truth, we can argue that the structure itself of truth, and precisely its logical-phenomenological structure, *compels* to believe. Faith is founded on the truth in the moment in which the discourse of truth risks to fall in a contradiction, or in a false*hood* consisting in affirming what it cannot affirm due to the limited feature of its vision, that is in affirming to already see what it does not manage to see: the synthesis of unconditional and conditional being, of infinite and finite. We can agree that seeing facie ad faciem is the undeniable destiny of truth, but we argue that facies ad faciem is not the feature of truth within the conditions where the truth is placed in us.

In conclusion, affirming to see what is not seen means to fall in a contradiction. Truth put itself in an impasse, from which to go out, thanks to a faith that has to be defined in a not nihilistic way or purged of nihilistic presuppositions. Faith has to be regarded as keeping the perspective of the truth along a path where the concrete determinations of its manifestation are not yet evident.

12. Truth and principle of benevolence

Faith is then the recognition, within the truth, of the limit of the contents attainable by it. This recognition, instead of making faith the place of an arbitrary belief driven to the exercise of an unilateral or even violent will, may be the condition of a shared search and of a principle of benevolence towards a plural mode of truth orientation. The attitude of benevolence would mean that the truth of being does not assume the philosophical positions, expressed outside of it, only as an error and, therefore, as a testimony of alienated thought, because of the persuasion that what is being is coming from nothing and goes into nothing, but also as a contribution to the manifestation of truth itself. Such a contribution takes also place *via negationis* and, precisely, in the denial of attempts to deny the truth. In a positive way, it would be configured as an exploration of different ways that converge, through the same different positions, to the truth. The truth would be nourished by a multiplicity of perspectives.

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